Etikett: Eric Fine

Mixed Signals in Emerging Markets

Van Eck Mexico Diana Cazadora Mixed Signals in Emerging MarketsMixed Signals in Emerging Markets

VanEck Unconstrained Emerging Markets Bond – Mixed Signals in Emerging Markets

The market environment remains unsettled. The quality of the macro flow in major economies is still largely uneven (despite a larger number of positive macro surprises in both G10 and EM) and many central banks find themselves in a policy quagmire as additional monetary easing results in stronger currencies and higher interest rates. Markets continue to price in a dovish scenario for the Fed that envisages only two full policy rate hikes in the next three years. Neutral investor positioning (as measured, for example, by the American Association of Individual Investors) is up again. We interpret this as a by-product of tensions between serious macro/policy headwinds and tailwinds. The “tailwinds” cluster includes tentative signs that EM growth might be bottoming out, reasonably strong external accounts in many EMs and the stabilization (at least for now) of China’s international reserves. On the “headwinds” side of the equation we find multiple unresolved issues in Europe, major imbalances in China (possibly made worse by the recent policy moves), a Fed struggling with forward guidance, a massive widening of the EM fiscal gap and deteriorating corporate profitability. It is also worth noting that China’s activity indicators and the external trade numbers softened in the past month. We are also alarmed by the extent of speculation with commodity futures in China.

We think that many tailwinds exist…but will ultimately face headwinds. First, Chinese authorities have managed to slow down capital outflows through official channels. The valuation-adjusted decline in international reserves is now smaller than in November- December 2015. Authorities are also implementing additional measures to prop up growth – mainly through additional credit supply – albeit as we noted the latest activity numbers came below expectations. Possible fiscal stimulus might prop-up GDP growth as well. These factors should reduce the immediate depreciation pressure on CNY and authorities should be able to maintain the existing exchange rate regime for a little longer, alleviating concerns about the impact of CNY devaluation on other emerging currencies (especially in Asia). There are tentative signs (macro surprises, EM PMIs a touch stronger than in December) that the growth outlook in EM stopped deteriorating and additional policy support (if EM FX weakness is contained) might prove crucial for further progress. Limited EM FX weakness is also generally beneficial for the inflation outlook and lower inflation can further boost real interest rates in EM – which already look attractive relative to the past lows and relative to U.S. treasuries. An important aspect of China’s current policy mix is its positive impact (however temporary) on the housing market and, as such, on global commodity prices which should provide additional support to EM FX and external balances. However, the extent of China’s commodity speculation is of course an important question mark.

We also continue to believe that the headwinds abound and are persistent…and are winning for now. Our key concern is that China’s near-term growth/FX relief might come at a price of worsening imbalances which would make any future resolution more problematic. Specifically, the leverage context remains highly worrisome as authorities intend to accelerate money supply (M2 growth). The same applies to a very high bank assets/nominal GDP ratio especially when compared to China’s relatively low per capita GDP. The success of China’s credit boost is questionable given that it now takes four extra units of credit (TSF) to produce one extra unit of nominal GDP. Despite the recent small improvements, both China’s growth slowdown and the decline in international reserves are of historic proportions and the reserve adequacy now looks stretched on several metrics. So, while we acknowledge the recent positive signals coming from China, our longer-term view on China’s economic, policy and political challenges remains unchanged. Another set of concerns relates to the recent fiscal deterioration in EM and rating downgrades it might entail. After several years of stability (2010-2014), the aggregate EM fiscal gap widened sharply in 2015 reaching 3.7% of GDP – the worst in the past 15 years – and consensus expects further deterioration to 4% of GDP in 2016 and only small improvement to 3.5% of GDP in 2017. We doubt that rating agencies would respond kindly to the deterioration and expect further rating/outlook downgrades. Our third set of concerns centers on unresolved European issues. We are now on the final stretch to the Brexit vote in June, while the Grexit problem is resurfacing again and will keep on reappearing unless there are more radical steps taken to reduce the debt burden. The immigration/ refugee issue looks thoroughly mishandled and we should expect a further rise of political extremism. The situation in the European banking sector is murky at best and bank CDS failed to narrow further after the initial declines after the ECB meetings in March and April. There is also growing evidence that negative interest rates are punishing banks. Fourth, corporate profitability is deteriorating and capex spending remains high relative to cash flow from operations. Finally, markets might be pricing in too much of the Fed’s dovishness (only 18bps of hikes are seen in the next 12 months) in a situation when many inflation indicators are picking up. The U.S. growth outlook is likely to improve in Q2 and it appears there is virtually no visible deterioration in the labor market conditions.

The portfolio implications of these developments can be summarized as follows: (1) be nimble and liquid (the unconstrained approach is more important than ever); (2) be aware of the headwinds (we view them as resurgent) and have a reaction function (ours is when China’s property market stalls again and/or the Fed hikes); (3) respect tailwinds in downturns – big and long rallies often happen when things are bad. Specifically, we maintain our defensive positions (around 30% of the portfolio) in hard currency bonds with spread/beta (Argentina and Brazil) and/or with defensive characteristics (Israel and South Korea). We also reduced exposure to local currency denominated bonds (to about 10% of the portfolio). We focus on countries with high real interest rates, with central banks that are not afraid to tighten if necessary and whose currencies were allowed to depreciate during the past risk-off episodes (Argentina, Indonesia and Brazil). Finally, we have exposure to selective EM corporates (about 15% of our portfolio) – we focus on liquid companies that are low beta to the economy and that can benefit from FX weakness through local-currency costs.

Exposure Types and Significant Changes

The changes to our top positions are summarized below. Our largest positions are currently: South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa.

We added hard currency sovereign exposure in South Korea and Israel. Both countries are high-rated net creditors with solid fiscal and external positions and we regard their hard currency bonds as defensive diversifiers.

We also added hard currency sovereign exposure in Chile, Turkey and the Philippines. The external balances in Chile and Turkey are improving and the external position of the Philippines remains robust. It was also encouraging that the new governor of Turkey’s central bank has not surprised markets on the dovish side during his first monetary policy decision.

We reduced local currency exposure in Peru, Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia, authorities’ failure to resolve the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) saga once and for all – with the latest episode genuinely surprising markets – is weighing on local assets. In Peru and Indonesia, local currencies no longer look cheap relative to the underlying commodity prices and in Indonesia there is an additional supply risk.

We also reduced local currency exposure in Mexico and Russia on concerns that they have over-reacted to commodity price stability.

Fund Performance

  • The Fund (EMBAX) gained 1.28% in April, compared to a 2.17% gain for a 50% local-50% hard-currency index.
  • The Fund’s biggest winners were Brazil, Argentina, and Indonesia. The Fund’s biggest losers were Russia, Mexico and Peru.
  • Turning to the market’s performance, the GBI-EM’s biggest winners were Brazil, Peru and Colombia. The biggest losers were Poland, Romania and China.

The EMBI’s biggest winners were Belize, Venezula and Angola, while its biggest losers were Malaysia, Ivory Coast and China.

†Monthly returns are not annualized.

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the portfolio manager and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time.

Diversification does not assure a profit or prevent against a loss.

Expenses: Class A: Gross 1.44%; Net 1.25%. Expenses are capped contractually until 05/01/17 at 1.25% for Class A. Caps exclude certain expenses, such as interest. Please note that, generally, unconstrained bond funds may have higher fees than core bond funds due to the specialized nature of their strategies.

The tables above present past performance which is no guarantee of future results and which may be lower or higher than current performance. Returns reflect applicable fee waivers and/or expense reimbursements. Had the Fund incurred all expenses and fees, investment returns would have been reduced. Investment returns and Fund share values will fluctuate so that investors’ shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Fund returns assume that dividends and capital gains distributions have been reinvested in the Fund at Net Asset Value (NAV). Index returns assume that dividends of the index constituents have been reinvested. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal; please see disclaimers on next page. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance current to the most recent month ended.

By Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager

11 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) is a strategic development company, wholly owned by the Government of Malaysia. The G10 currencies are 10 of the most heavily traded currencies in the world.

Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rate changes that reflects the change in a bond’s price given a change in yield. This duration measure is appropriate for bonds with embedded options. Quantitative Easing by a central bank increases the money supply engaging in open market operations in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity. Monetary Easing is an economic tool employed by a central bank to reduce interest rates and increase money supply in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Correlation is a statistical measure of how two variables move in relation to one other. Liquidity Illusion refers to the effect that an independent variable might have in the liquidity of a security as such variable fluctuates overtime. A Holdouts Issue in the fixed income asset class occurs when a bond issuing country or entity is in default or at the brink of default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure its debt held by existing bond holding investors.

Emerging Markets Hard Currency Bonds refers to bonds denominated in currencies that are generally widely accepted around the world (such as the U.S.-Dollar, Euro or Yen). Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds are bonds denominated in the local currency of the issuer. Emerging Markets Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by national governments of emerging countries in order to finance a country’s growth. Emerging Markets Quasi- Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by corporations domiciled in emerging countries that are either 100% government owned or whose debts are 100% government guaranteed. Emerging Markets Corporate Bonds are bonds issued by non-government owned corporations that are domiciled in emerging countries.

All indices are unmanaged and include the reinvestment of all dividends, but do not reflect the payment of transaction costs, advisory fees or expenses that are associated with an investment in the Fund. An index’s performance is not illustrative of the Fund’s performance. Indices are not se¬curities in which investments can be made. The 50/50 benchmark (the “Index”) is a blended index consisting of 50% J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified and 50% J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM). The J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM) tracks local currency bonds issued by Emerging Markets governments. The index spans over 15 countries. J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified tracks returns for actively traded external debt in¬struments in emerging markets, and is also J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S-dollar emerging markets debt benchmark. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Country Currency Index (EMCI) is a tradable benchmark for emerging markets currencies versus the U.S. Dollar (USD). The Index compromises 10 currencies: BRL, CLP, CNH, HUF, INR, MXN, RUB, SGD, TRY and ZAR. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is an indicator designed to measure consumer confidence, which is defined as the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers are expressing through their activities of savings and spending.

Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but J.P. Morgan does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The Index is used with permission. The index may not be copied, used or distributed without J.P. Morgan’s written approval. Copyright 2014, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the portfolio manager and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time and portfolio managers of other investment strategies may take an opposite opinion than those stated herein. Not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results or investment advice. Current market conditions may not continue. Non-VanEck proprietary information con¬tained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Van Eck Securities Corporation ©2016 VanEck.

Investing involves risk, including loss of principal. You can lose money by investing in the Fund. Any investment in the Fund should be part of an over¬all investment program, not a complete program. The Fund is subject to risks associated with its investments in emerging markets securities. Investing in foreign denominated and/or domiciled securities may involve heightened risk due to currency fluctuations, and economic and political risks, which may be enhanced in emerging markets. As the Fund may invest in securities denominated in foreign currencies and some of the income received by the Fund will be in foreign currencies, changes in currency exchange rates may negatively impact the Fund’s return. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. The Fund may also be subject to credit risk, interest rate risk, sovereign debt risk, tax risk, non-diversification risk and risks associated with non-invest¬ment grade securities. Please see the prospectus and summary prospectus for information on these and other risk considerations.

Investors should consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, and charges and expenses carefully before investing. Bond and bond funds will decrease in value as interest rates rise. The prospectus and summary prospectus contain this as well as other information. Please read them carefully before investing. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance information current to the most recent month end and for a free prospectus and summary prospectus.

China Developments Lead Recent Tailwinds

China Developments Lead Recent Tailwinds

  • Capital outflows and currency stabilization in China help the overall emerging markets (EM) environment
  • Headwinds including leverage in China, fiscal deterioration, and European issues remain prevalent
  • Liquidity, defensive positioning and unconstrained approach remain crucial in periods of uncertainty

Market Overview

The market environment remains unsettled. The quality of the macro flow in major economies is still very uneven (despite a larger number of positive macro surprises in both developed G10 and EM) and many central banks find themselves in a policy quagmire where additional monetary easing results in stronger currencies and higher interest rates. Markets – no doubt “inspired” by Janet Yellen’s end-of-March speech – continue to price in a very dovish scenario for the Federal Reserve (Fed) that envisages only two full policy rate hikes in the next three years. A big increase in neutral investor positioning (as measured, for example, by the American Association of Individual Investors) in past weeks is a reflection of these uncertainties which, in turn, is a byproduct of tensions between serious macro/policy headwinds and tailwinds. The “tailwinds” cluster includes a more sanguine near-term outlook for China, tentative signs that EM growth might be bottoming out, and reasonably strong external accounts in many EMs. On the “headwinds” side of the equation, we find multiple unresolved issues in Europe, major imbalances in China (possibly made worse by the recent policy moves), a Fed struggling with forward guidance, a massive widening of the EM fiscal gap, and deteriorating corporate profitability.

Portfolio Review

We believe that the recent tailwinds are likely to dominate for the near term. It looks like Chinese authorities have managed to slow down capital outflows through official channels. The decline in international reserves is now smaller than in November-December 2015. Authorities are also implementing additional measures to support growth, mainly through additional credit supply. Possible fiscal stimulus might prop up GDP growth as well. These factors should reduce the immediate depreciation pressure on the renminbi (CNY) and authorities should be able to maintain the existing exchange rate regime for a little longer, alleviating concerns about the impact of CNY devaluation on other emerging market currencies (especially in Asia). Additional EM foreign exchange (FX) strength is a benefit to the inflation outlook and in this environment, the Fed’s dovish policy stance might provide EM central banks with more room to ease, which could facilitate a cycle of stronger currencies, lower inflation, lower interest rates and a better growth outlook. There are already tentative signs (better macro surprises and higher PMIs) that the growth outlook in EM might be improving. Consensus forecasts for 2016 quarterly GDP growth in EM have also been edging up since mid-March and additional policy support might prove crucial for further progress. Lower inflation can further boost real interest rates in EM, which already look attractive relative to the past lows and relative to U.S. Treasuries (UST). An important, although temporary, aspect of China’s current policy mix is its positive impact on the housing market and, as such, on global commodity prices, especially metals, which should provide additional support to EM FX and external balances.

However, persistent headwinds abound. Our key concern is that China’s near-term growth/FX relief might come at the price of worsening imbalances, which will likely make any future resolution more problematic. Specifically, the leverage context remains highly worrisome as authorities intend to accelerate M2 money supply (includes cash, checking and savings deposits, money market mutual funds) growth. The same applies to a very high bank assets/nominal GDP ratio (especially when compared to China’s still relatively low per capita GDP). The success of China’s credit boost is questionable given that it now takes four extra units of credit (measured by Total Social Financing, a figure the Chinese government created to track all the money in its system) to produce one extra unit of nominal GDP. Despite the recent small improvements, both China’s growth slowdown and the decline in international reserves are of historic proportions and the reserve adequacy now looks stretched on several metrics. So, while we acknowledge the recent positive signals coming from China, our longer-term view on China’s economic, policy and, political challenges remains unchanged.

Another set of concerns relates to the recent fiscal deterioration in EM and rating downgrades it might entail. After several years of stability (2010-2014), the aggregate EM fiscal gap widened sharply in 2015, reaching 3.7% of GDP – the worst in the past 15 years – and consensus expects further deterioration to 4% of GDP in 2016. We doubt that rating agencies will respond kindly to the deterioration and we expect further rating/outlook downgrades.

Our third set of concerns centers on unresolved European issues. The potential for Greece to leave the eurozone (“Grexit”) is resurfacing again and will keep on reappearing unless there are more radical steps to help reduce the debt burden. The immigration/refugee issue looks thoroughly mishandled and we should expect further instances of political extremism. The situation in the banking sector appears murky at best and bank credit default swap spreads started to widen again after a brief post-European Central Bank (ECB) respite in early March. There is also growing evidence that negative interest rates are punishing banks. Finally, corporate profitability is deteriorating and capex spending remains high relative to cash flow from operations.

The portfolio implications of these developments are as follows: (1) be nimble and liquid (and the unconstrained approach is more important than ever); (2) be aware of the headwinds that we view as resurgent and have a reaction function (ours is when China’s property market stalls again and/or the Fed hikes); (3) respect tailwinds in downturns – big and long rallies often happen when things are bad.

Specifically, we maintain our defensive positions (approximately 40% of the portfolio) in hard-currency bonds with spread/beta positions (i.e., Argentina and Brazil) and/or with defensive characteristics (i.e., South Korea). We also maintain selective exposure to local-currency denominated bonds (approximately 50% of the portfolio). We focus on countries with high real interest rates, where central banks that are not afraid to tighten if necessary and whose currencies were allowed to depreciate during the past risk-off episodes (i.e., Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brazil). Finally, we have exposure to selective EM corporates (about 10% of our portfolio) with a focus on liquid companies that demonstrate low-beta to the economy and that can benefit from FX weakness through local-currency costs.

Exposure Types and Significant ChangesThe changes to our top positions are summarized below. Our largest positions are currently: Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and South Africa.

  • We added local-currency sovereign exposure in Indonesia and Peru to potentially benefit from the uptick in commodity prices and lower than expected inflation that allowed the Bank of Indonesia to cut and the central bank of Peru to hold. We also expect to benefit from changes in Indonesia’s regulatory environment that should boost local demand for government bonds.
  • We also added local-currency exposure to Brazil where impeachment sentiment is rapidly gaining momentum and inflation appears to be topping off. We also increased local exposure in Mexico and Malaysia where inflation remains under control.
  • We reduced hard-currency sovereign exposure in South Korea and Israel – low beta bonds that have performed well but have been reduced to reallocate to more compelling opportunities.
  • We also reduced hard-currency sovereign exposure in the Philippines, Chile, and Hungary (where Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s fight with the EU has intensified lately).

Fund Performance

  • The Fund (EMBAX) gained 3.27% in March, compared to a 6.16% gain for a 50% local-50% hard-currency index.The Fund’s biggest winners were Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Peru. The Fund’s biggest losers were Israel, South Korea, and Indonesia.
  • Turning to the market’s performance, the GBI-EM’s biggest winners were Russia, Colombia, and South Africa. The biggest losers were Nigeria, China, and Thailand.
  • The EMBI’s biggest winners were Ecuador, Mongolia, and Zambia, while its biggest losers were Serbia, Poland, and Romania.

Manager Commentary

By: Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the portfolio manager and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time.

Diversification does not assure a profit or prevent against a loss.

Expenses: Class A: Gross 1.32%; Net 1.25%. Expenses are capped contractually until 05/01/16 at 1.25% for Class A. Caps exclude certain expenses, such as interest. Please note that, generally, unconstrained bond funds may have higher fees than core bond funds due to the specialized nature of their strategies. The tables above present past performance which is no guarantee of future results and which may be lower or higher than current performance. Returns reflect applicable fee waivers and/or expense reimbursements. Had the Fund incurred all expenses and fees, investment returns would have been reduced. Investment returns and Fund share values will fluctuate so that investors’ shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Fund returns assume that dividends and capital gains distributions have been reinvested in the Fund at Net Asset Value (NAV). Index returns assume that dividends of the index constituents have been reinvested. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal; please see disclaimers on next page. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance current to the most recent month ended.

Data Sources: VanEck Research, FactSet. All portfolio weightings and statements herein as of March 31, 2016. Unless otherwise indicated.

Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rate changes that reflects the change in a bond’s price given a change in yield. This duration measure is appropriate for bonds with embedded options. Quantitative Easing by a central bank increases the money supply engaging in open market operations in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity. Monetary Easing is an economic tool employed by a central bank to reduce interest rates and increase money supply in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Correlation is a statistical measure of how two variables move in relation to one other. Liquidity Illusion refers to the effect that an independent variable might have in the liquidity of a security as such variable fluctuates overtime. A Holdouts Issue in the fixed income asset class occurs when a bond issuing country or entity is in default or at the brink of default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure its debt held by existing bond holding investors.

Emerging Markets Hard Currency Bonds refers to bonds denominated in currencies that are generally widely accepted around the world (such as the U.S.-Dollar, Euro or Yen). Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds are bonds denominated in the local currency of the issuer. Emerging Markets Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by national governments of emerging countries in order to finance a country’s growth. Emerging Markets Quasi-Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by corporations domiciled in emerging countries that are either 100% government owned or whose debts are 100% government guaranteed. Emerging Markets Corporate Bonds are bonds issued by non-government owned corporations that are domiciled in emerging countries. A Supranational is an international organization, or union, whose members transcend national boundaries and share in the decision-making. Examples of supranationals are: World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for the euro and administers monetary policy of the Eurozone, which consists of 19 EU member states and is one of the largest currency areas in the world. The Labor Market Conditions Index (LMCI) is a dynamic factor model index that combines 19 labor market indicators to provide an assessment of overall labor market conditions. The Employment Cost Index tracks the changes in the costs of labor for businesses in the United States economy.

All indices are unmanaged and include the reinvestment of all dividends, but do not reflect the payment of transaction costs, advisory fees or expenses that are associated with an investment in the Fund. An index’s performance is not illustrative of the Fund’s performance. Indices are not securities in which investments can be made. The 50/50 benchmark (the “Index”) is a blended index consisting of 50% J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified and 50% J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM). The J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM) tracks local currency bonds issued by Emerging Markets governments. The index spans over 15 countries. J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified tracks returns for actively traded external debt instruments in emerging markets, and is also J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S-dollar emerging markets debt benchmark. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Country Currency Index (EMCI) is a tradable benchmark for emerging markets currencies versus the U.S. Dollar (USD). The Index compromises 10 currencies: BRL, CLP, CNH, HUF, INR, MXN, RUB, SGD, TRY and ZAR. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is an indicator designed to measure consumer confidence, which is defined as the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers are expressing through their activities of savings and spending.

Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but J.P. Morgan does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The Index is used with permission. The index may not be copied, used or distributed without J.P. Morgan’s written approval. Copyright 2014, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the portfolio manager and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time and portfolio managers of other investment strategies may take an opposite opinion than those stated herein. Not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results or investment advice. Current market conditions may not continue. Non-VanEck proprietary information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this aterial may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Van Eck Securities Corporation ©2016 VanEck.

Investing involves risk, including loss of principal. You can lose money by investing in the Fund. Any investment in the Fund should be part of an overall investment program, not a complete program. The Fund is subject to risks associated with its investments in emerging markets securities. Investing in foreign denominated and/or domiciled securities may involve heightened risk due to currency fluctua-tions, and economic and political risks, which may be enhanced in emerging markets. As the Fund may invest in securities denominated in foreign currencies and some of the income received by the Fund will be in foreign currencies, changes in currency exchange rates may negatively impact the Fund’s return. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. The Fund may also be subject to credit risk, in¬terest rate risk, sovereign debt risk, tax risk, non-diversification risk and risks associated with non-investment grade securities. Please see the prospectus and summary prospectus for information on these and other risk considerations.

Investors should consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, and charges and expenses carefully before investing. Bond and bond funds will decrease in value as interest rates rise. The prospectus and summary prospectus contain this as well as other information. Please read them carefully before investing. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance information current to the most recent month end and for a free prospectus and summary prospectus.

Slippery Samba

Slippery Samba

Brazil Trip Notes – Slippery Samba

Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager Emerging Markets Fixed Income Investment Team

Eric Fine recently visited Brazil and observed firsthand the intertwined political and economic dynamics that continue to pressure the country’s overall health. As political scandal and credit downgrades make the headlines, the situation in Brazil appears to be worsening. While the long-term ramifications for Brazil remain uncertain, it’s difficult to ignore the precarious stability of the country today.

Brazil’s debt dynamic is deteriorating. Extremely large fiscal deficits are undermining what had heretofore been an anchor. As a result, further rating downgrades are possible and the real seems especially vulnerable.

The country’s economy is still contracting, making its current decline one for the history books. Credit appears virtually frozen at private and state banks and it is hard to see a growth rebound in the foreseeable future.

Politics are mixed. On the positive side, the political party of current President Dilma Rousseff (the PT party) appears unlikely to win the presidential election in 2018, and any moves toward impeachment could bring a positive market scenario forward. On the other hand, 2018 is a long time away and any future government will have to deal with the steadily building burden of higher debts and deficits.
One silver lining is the country’s external accounts. The country is a net external creditor, and the dramatic selloff of the real and the near-depression in the economy are contributing to a low current account deficit. This is not a theoretical positive – the country has been buying back its external debt.

Brazil’s fiscal deficits of roughly 10% of GDP are a profound headwind. Most importantly, if not reversed, we expect this will leave the country with gross public debt of over 80% of GDP by the end of 2017. For comparison, by our calculations, the public debt level at the end of 2014 was just under 60% of GDP. Most of the borrowing to finance these deficits will be in local currency, which we see as a constant source of pressure for the local bond market. The fiscal deficit also keeps upward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations, which further undermines the currency.

Credit is essentially frozen, with private banks in a defensive mode, and state banks constrained by the government’s fiscal situation and high domestic interest rates. One big difference between Brazil today and Brazil during its last major crisis (2002) is that households are now levered, meaning limited upside from domestic consumption. Although non-performing loans (NPLs) aren’t high yet, we believe we are entering a phase where they will begin to be recognized, and defaults on some corporates should be expected.

There are positives and negatives in the political sphere. In the minus column, opposition support for any political reform while President Rousseff is in office is unlikely, for the obvious reason that it would help her party. This matters because indexation of wages and social security benefits are very hard for even the opposition to support, perpetuating the underlying fiscal problem. In the plus column, the PT party is highly likely to be a non-factor in 2018 elections. In our estimation, Brazil’s electorate usually punishes presidents for generating adverse economic outcomes. If President Rousseff is impeached, moreover, this could bring such a scenario forward, though the impeachment process is complicated.

Still, Brazil has more hard-currency reserves than debt, and they use them. They have been buying back dollar debt, so the country’s net creditor status has very practical implications. This makes it difficult for us to have one overarching opinion on Brazil. We find the hard-currency debt of the sovereign and of quasi-sovereign entities such as Petrobras attractive, despite our concerns over local currency and the economy overall.

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of VanEck and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time.

THIS MATERIAL MAY ONLY BE PROVIDED TO YOU BY VANECK AND IS FOR YOUR PERSONAL USE ONLY AND MUST NOT BE PASSED ON TO THIRD PARTIES WITHOUT THE PRIOR EXPRESS WRITTEN CONSENT OF VANECK. IF YOU HAVE NOT RECEIVED THIS MATERIAL FROM VANECK, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT YOU HAVE RECEIVED IT FROM A NON-AUTHORIZED SOURCE THAT DID NOT ACT ON BEHALF OF VANECK AND THAT ANY REVIEW, USE, DISSEMINATION, DISCLOSURE, OR COPYING OF THIS MATERIAL IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.

Information contained in this presentation is for information purposes only and should not be construed as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument, product, or service sponsored by VanEck or its affiliates. This material does not constitute an offer to sell or solicitation to buy any security, including shares of any fund. An offer or solicitation will be made only through the fund’s official offering document and will be subject to the terms and conditions contained therein.

Investments in foreign securities involve a greater degree of risk, including currency fluctuations, economic instability, and political risk. Changes in currency rates and differences in accounting and taxation policies outside the U.S. can raise or lower returns. Investing in emerging markets involves a heightened degree of risk, including smaller sized markets, less liquid markets, and other risks associated with less established legal, regulatory, and business infrastructures to support securities markets. Due to these factors and others, the risks associated with emerging markets could be increased. Bonds and bond funds will decrease in value as interest rates rise.

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the author, and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time, and portfolio managers of other investment strategies may take an opposite opinion than those stated herein. Not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results, or investment advice. Current market conditions may not continue.

The information herein reflects prevailing market conditions and our judgments as of the date of this document, which are subject to change. In preparing this document, we have relied upon and assumed, without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all information available from public sources. Opinions and estimates may be changed without notice and involve a number of assumptions that may not prove valid. There is no guarantee that any forecasts or opinions in this material will be realized. Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments contain risk and may lose value. This information should not be construed as investment advice. This information should not be construed as sales or marketing material or an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument, product, or service sponsored by Van Eck Associates Corporation or its affiliates.

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Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges

Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges

Van Eck Unconstrained Emerging Markets Bond Fund

Manager Commentary – Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges

By: Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager

November 2015

Executive Summary

  • Emerging markets (EM) debt still facing many headwinds
  • Strong idyosincratic drivers in Argentina, Venezuela and Russia
  • EM real rates remain low by historic standards

Overview

We still see many headwinds for EM debt including, but not limited to, the possible upcoming Federal Reserve (Fed) rate hikes, a looming potential devaluation in China, unstable commodity prices, a still weak EM growth trajectory, inflation risk, implosion in Brazil and potentially approaching troubles in Turkey. Regarding the Fed, just as the market was consistently mispricing the timing of their first hike relative to “dots” implied timing, the same seems to be occurring for the timing and magnitude of the anticipated subsequent rate hikes…fasten your duration seatbelts, in our opinion. Despite China telling the world that its currency devaluation will happen someday, it did not trigger capital flight. Shouldn’t the usual rule of thumb on devaluations apply, namely, you do them big and early in conjunction with some real or pretend reforms? How does it not get worse the longer China waits? It is maintaining a currency peg while cutting rates, making it cheaper for investors to short the currency. Furthermore, the rapidly approaching Fed hike means a tighter policy in China, via the exchange rate peg, in a time of declining growth rates for an exporting economy. The risks of unstable or weak commodity prices seem high. Brazil remains in the grips of a vicious political and economic adverse feedback loop of worse outcomes (e.g., recession) creating divisive politics and policy paralysis. Turkey does not seem to be a market concern, but we think it should be. President Erdogan is about to complete his takeover of state institutions which includes the likely departure of the current central bank head. The policy implication could be a central bank easing policy, risking currency weakness and self-fulfilling inflation expectations. Additionally, they may be tempted to intervene in the currency market, threatening their already-low reserves.

But, we think there are still investments that can outperform in the face of these risks. Our portfolio could be thought of as consisting of two halves: idiosyncratic and defensive. The idiosyncratic portion is primarily composed of Argentina and Venezuela dollar-denominated bonds, and both Russia rouble- and dollar-denominated bonds. As the term idiosyncratic implies, we see asset price performance almost entirely based on country-specific factors rather than systematic factors such as U.S. interest rates, etc. In Argentina, the idiosyncratic driver is the new government’s likely settlement with its holdout creditors, while in Venezuela, government bonds are trading near recovery value. In Russia, the idiosyncratic driver for local-currency bonds is declining inflation. The defensive half of the portfolio is made up of some high-spread dollar-denominated short-dated bonds with cheap spreads relative to fundamentals. The spread duration is such that if one is correct, the reward would be the constant carry. One of the largest allocations is to low duration dollar-denominated bonds in South Korea, which is experiencing ongoing balance of payments surpluses and can perform defensively in risk-off scenarios.

Why focus on Argentina and Venezuela as key idiosyncratic diversifiers? We have long maintained that the November presidential elections in Argentina would result in a more market-friendly government than the one established under former President Cristina Kirchner. The election victory of the opposition candidate Mauricio Macri – which was not an obvious outcome even a couple of months ago – might be a real game-changer. The new government’s line-up is very impressive, and so far, Macri has been sticking to his pre-election promises of dealing with the existing imbalances, such as multiple exchange rates, in a timely fashion. The Macri administration is also likely to bring in the resolution of the holdouts situation, paving the way for Argentina’s eventual rating upgrade to single-‘B’. We consider it a good sign that in late November Moody’s changed Argentina’s outlook to positive. The bottom line is that the country is solvent, but it currently has no market access, which should change when the holdouts issue is resolved. This is now a more likely outcome, in our opinion. Venezuela’s macro outlook remains very challenging but markets continue to price in an extremely high chance of default under our recovery value assumptions. Our position is that 100% probabilities of default, in general, are to be viewed skeptically. It remains to be seen whether the National Assembly elections on December 6 will bring in meaningful policy changes or closer relations with the U.S. – but there are several very low-hanging policy “fruits” (such as higher gasoline prices, streamlining the exchange rate system) that can reduce imbalances if there is enough political will.

Why a less negative perspective on Russia? First, Russia is emerging in a new light following the Paris tragedy and the shooting down of its military plane by Turkey. We think that appetite for an escalation of sanctions against Russia in this new environment is low. The rating agencies have already noted that the improving relations between Russia and the U.S. may boost Russia’s rating. Second, the authorities’ response to a considerable deterioration in the external conditions following the introduction of sanctions was surprisingly orthodox and helped avoid a major drain on reserves. Russia seems to be emerging from this episode with a stronger credit profile (e.g., stable reserves, lower external debt, a larger current account surplus). Third, the rouble was used mainly as a shock-absorber in the past months and is now significantly undervalued both on a short-term basis and also when looking at fundamental metrics. Additionally, a major disinflation move is expected in the next 3-6 months allowing the central bank to ease further. All this makes us more comfortable owning non-sanctioned Russia securities (sovereigns [OFZs] and hard-currency quasi-sovereign debt). Fourth, duration makes the trade attractive, in our opinion. Inflation could decline to 6% by the end of 2016 with the policy rate (and yield curve) around 10%. So, with carry and duration, we are looking at rates that are possibly 100bp-200bp lower, which may provide a cushion for potential currency weakness.

Why still unable to find attractive local currency? First, even though real interest rates in emerging markets increased in the past few weeks, they remain low by historic standards and also in comparison to real rates in developed markets (real interest rates in the U.S. have recovered to their long-term average). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) continues to give strong signals that it is ready to hike in December. Such a move might not only pull nominal yields in the U.S. (at least in the near term) but also real rates in emerging markets. Second, with the renminbi in November finally becoming part of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, an international reserve asset which is based on the values of major currencies, the focus is now shifting to possible currency devaluation in China and its potential impact on the rest of EM FX (both in terms of the initial knee-jerk reaction and the subsequent rounds of “currency wars”). The offshore currency (CNH) is weakening relative to the controlled onshore currency (CNY). Third, even though there were some improvements in the EM macro data flow in the past weeks, we have yet to see any meaningful improvement in the EM growth outlook. Consensus continues to downgrade the 2016 growth forecasts in all EM regions – reflecting debt overhang and low commodity prices among other things. The expected growth differential between EM and the U.S. continues to narrow down, undermining the fundamental support for EM FX. We should note the potential for contagion risk in Brazil and Turkey perhaps, due to the size and importance of their economies.

A key feature of the intial steps of our investment process compares the risk premium of a country to its fundamentals) and we should emphasize that it does uncover pockets of value in local-currency markets. Colombia, Brazil, Zambia, Nigeria and others pay high real interest rates. However, in each of these cases, these investments failed the following step of our process which test specific risk factors. Colombia has been very correlated to oil prices, and we expect it will continue to be, and thus the failed correlation test, Brazil fails the policy/politics test, and Zambia and Nigeria are slowly moving to capital control regimes, in our opinion, and therefore, fail the policy/politics tests.

Exposure Types and Significant Changes The changes to our top positions are summarized below. Our largest positions are currently: South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa and Russia.

  • We added local-currency sovereign and hard-currency quasi-sovereign debt exposure in Russia. We expect to benefit from a combination of a change in the geopolitical narrative that reduces the potential risk of additional sanctions and disinflation that should allow the central bank to further slash interest rates.
  • We reduced sovereign and quasi-sovereign hard-currency debt exposure in Chile due to concerns about the price of copper in light of the ongoing growth slowdown in China.
  • We also reduced local-currency sovereign exposure in Romania due to concerns about local politics and policy noise.
  • We reduced hard-currency sovereign exposure in Israel due to greater vulnerability risks as well as concerns about duration. We also reduced quasi-sovereign hard-currency exposure in Vietnam on greater vulnerability risks.

Fund Performance

The Fund (EMBAX) gained 0.13% in November, compared to a 1.11% loss for a 50% local-50% hard-currency index.
The Fund’s biggest winners were Venezuela (hard-currency sovereign), South Africa (hard currency sovereign and quasi-sovereign) and Ivory Coast (hard-currency sovereign). The Fund’s biggest losers were Argentina (hard-currency sovereign), Romania (local-currency sovereign) and Mongolia (hard-currency sovereign).

Turning to the market’s performance, the GBI-EM’s biggest winners were Nigeria, Brazil and Indonesia. The biggest losers were Colombia, South Africa and Hungary – with Colombia and South Africa affected by low commodity prices and policy rate hikes.
The EMBI’s biggest winners were Venezuela, Kazakhstan and Malaysia, while its biggest losers were Egypt, Chile and Mongolia (with the latter two affected by concerns about the price of copper).

Diversification does not assure a profit or prevent against a loss.

Expenses: Class A: Gross 1.32%; Net 1.25%. Expenses are capped contractually until 05/01/16 at 1.25% for Class A. Caps exclude certain expenses, such as interest. Please note that, generally, unconstrained bond funds may have higher fees than core bond funds due to the specialized nature of their strategies. The tables above present past performance which is no guarantee of future results and which may be lower or higher than current performance. Returns reflect applicable fee waivers and/or expense reimbursements. Had the Fund incurred all expenses and fees, investment returns would have been reduced. Investment returns and Fund share values will fluctuate so that investors’ shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Fund returns assume that dividends and capital gains distributions have been reinvested in the Fund at Net Asset Value (NAV). Index returns assume that dividends of the index constituents have been reinvested. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal; please see disclaimers on next page. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance current to the most recent month ended.

Data Sources: Van Eck Research, FactSet. All portfolio weightings and statements herein as of November 30, 2015. Unless otherwise indicated.

Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rate changes that reflects the change in a bond’s price given a change in yield. This duration measure is appropriate for bonds with embedded options. Quantitative Easing by a central bank increases the money supply engaging in open market operations in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity. Monetary Easing is an economic tool employed by a central bank to reduce interest rates and increase money supply in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Correlation is a statistical measure of how two variables move in relation to one other. Liquidity Illusion refers to the effect that an independent variable might have in the liquidity of a security as such variable fluctuates overtime. A Holdouts Issue in the fixed income asset class occurs when a bond issuing country or entity is in default or at the brink of default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure its debt held by existing bond holding investors.

Emerging Markets Hard Currency Bonds refers to bonds denominated in currencies that are generally widely accepted around the world (such as the U.S.-Dollar, Euro or Yen). Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds are bonds denominated in the local currency of the issuer. Emerging Markets Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by national governments of emerging countries in order to finance a country’s growth. Emerging Markets Quasi-Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by corporations domiciled in emerging countries that are either 100% government owned or whose debts are 100% government guaranteed. Emerging Markets Corporate Bonds are bonds issued by non-government owned corporations that are domiciled in emerging countries. A Supranational is an international organization, or union, whose members transcend national boundaries and share in the decision-making. Examples of supranationals are: World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for the euro and administers monetary policy of the Eurozone, which consists of 19 EU member states and is one of the largest currency areas in the world. The Labor Market Conditions Index (LMCI) is a dynamic factor model index that combines 19 labor market indicators to provide an assessment of overall labor market conditions. The Employment Cost Index tracks the changes in the costs of labor for businesses in the United States economy.

All indices are unmanaged and include the reinvestment of all dividends, but do not reflect the payment of transaction costs, advisory fees or expenses that are associated with an investment in the Fund. An index’s performance is not illustrative of the Fund’s performance. Indices are not securities in which investments can be made. The 50/50 benchmark (the “Index”) is a blended index consisting of 50% J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified and 50% J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM). The J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM) tracks local currency bonds issued by Emerging Markets governments. The index spans over 15 countries. J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified tracks returns for actively traded external debt instruments in emerging markets, and is also J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S-dollar emerging markets debt benchmark. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Country Currency Index (EMCI) is a tradable benchmark for emerging markets currencies versus the U.S. Dollar (USD). The Index compromises 10 currencies: BRL, CLP, CNH, HUF, INR, MXN, RUB, SGD, TRY and ZAR. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is an indicator designed to measure consumer confidence, which is defined as the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers are expressing through their activities of savings and spending.

Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but J.P. Morgan does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The Index is used with permission. The index may not be copied, used or distributed without J.P. Morgan’s written approval. Copyright 2014, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.

Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the portfolio manager and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time and portfolio managers of other investment strategies may take an opposite opinion than those stated herein. Not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results or investment advice. Current market conditions may not continue. Non-Van Eck Global proprietary information contained herein has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. No part of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without express written permission of Van Eck Securities Corporation ©2015 Van Eck Securities Corporation.

Investing involves risk, including loss of principal. You can lose money by investing in the Fund. Any investment in the Fund should be part of an overall investment program, not a complete program. The Fund is subject to risks associated with its investments in emerging markets securities. Investing in foreign denominated and/or domiciled securities may involve heightened risk due to currency fluctua-tions, and economic and political risks, which may be enhanced in emerging markets. As the Fund may invest in securities denominated in foreign currencies and some of the income received by the Fund will be in foreign currencies, changes in currency exchange rates may negatively impact the Fund’s return. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. The Fund may also be subject to credit risk, in¬terest rate risk, sovereign debt risk, tax risk, non-diversification risk and risks associated with non-investment grade securities. Please see the prospectus and summary prospectus for information on these and other risk considerations.

Investors should consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, and charges and expenses carefully before investing. Bond and bond funds will decrease in value as interest rates rise. The prospectus and summary prospectus contain this as well as other information. Please read them carefully before investing. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance information current to the most recent month end and for a free prospectus and summary prospectus.

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From Weakness to Resilience

Emerging Markets Bonds Then and Now: From Weakness to Resilience

From Weakness to Resilience Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager, Global Fixed Income, discusses the EM crises of the 80s and 90s and how they have been addressed through the Washington Consensus reforms.

”The Washington Consensus resulted in higher reserves and higher growth rates among emerging markets countries. Thus EM economies moved away from the original sin of having too much dollar-denominated debt.”

Van Eck is a U.S.-based asset management firm with more than five decades of global investment expertise.

Founded in 1955 by John C. van Eck, Van Eck Global was among the first U.S. money managers helping investors achieve greater diversification through global investing. Today, the firm continues this tradition by offering innovative, actively managed investment choices in hard assets, emerging markets, precious metals, fixed income, and other specialized, domestic and international asset classes. Van Eck currently manages assets on behalf of more than 400 institutions including endowments, foundations, hospitals, pensions, and private banks. The firm’s traditional and alternative strategies are offered in both fund and separate account portfolios.
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