The Renminbi is being manipulated, but Trump has it wrong: Chinese policymakers are helping stabilise the currency. The Renminbi is one of the least volatile global currencies as a result. Trump got China right…but for the wrong reasons. Chinese policymakers intervene in currency markets to keep the currency within a +/- 2% band from the close of the previous day’s closing rate. This process either generates foreign exchange reserves (if it sells Chinese currencies) or reduces reserves (if it supports the Renminbi). Foreign exchange reserves have fallen under the US$3tn level for the first time in six years, after peaking at US$3.99tn in June 2014. January’s US$12bn decline in foreign reserves could have been worse. Excluding valuation effects the decline would have been closer to US$40bn. The weakening of the Renminbi during 2016 prompted domestic investors and savers to look abroad in order to not lose purchasing power and boost investment returns in the face of the strong US Dollar. There are signs of a turnaround: the Renminbi has strengthened during 2017, likely assisting in reducing capital outflows. In addition to greater capital controls, the People’s Bank of China has increased rates on short-term repos for the first time since 2013, helping motivate more investors to keep currency in mainland China. The domestic outlook appears to be also helping, with our modified ‘Li Keqiang Index’ showing more stable growth in China over the past year. Estimates suggest that currency outflows have continued unabated since early 2015, totalling US$1.7tn over the period. Stemming the outflow of capital is a critical issue for Chinese authorities – a currency collapse could occur if China liberalises currency controls too fast, forcing the currency sharply lower and exacerbating capital outflows. Indeed, President Trump would be well served to improve Sino-US relations and support the Chinese efforts to stabilise its currency. With only the nascent signs of inflation appearing on a global level, a Chinese currency collapse could spark a new wave of global deflation, something the developed world does not need right now.
Martin Arnold, Global FX & Commodity Strategist at ETF Securities
Martin Arnoldjoined ETF Securities as a research analyst in 2009 and was promoted to Global FX & Commodity Strategist in 2014. Martin has a wealth of experience in strategy and economics with his most recent role formulating an FX strategy at an independent research consultancy. Martin has a strong background in macroeconomics and financial analysis – gained both at the Reserve Bank of Australia and in the private commercial banking sector – and experience covering a range of asset classes including equities and bonds. Martin holds a Bachelor of Economics from the University of New South Wales (Australia), a Master of Commerce from the University of Wollongong (Australia) and attained a Graduate Diploma of Applied Finance and Investment from the Securities Institute of Australia.
More Easing Ahead. Following the weakening of a number of key economic indicators in August, we believe that China’s government will step up its stimulus policies in the coming weeks and months.
The People’s Bank of China last week pumped 500bn yuan of liquidity into banks and cut the 14-day repo rate following the release of poor August economic data.
While structural reforms will continue and balanced growth remains a key priority, we believe targeted stimulus will be accelerated to ensure growth meets the government’s 7-8% target.
A gradual ratcheting up of targeted monetary and fiscal stimulus, together with expected increased inflows into domestic A-shares as the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect program goes into effect in mid-October should support the continued strong performance of A shares as we move into Q4 2014 and beyond.
Disappointing data reported over the past month is likely to serve as a catalyst for further policy stimulus in the next few months in our view. While toeing the official line that reform takes precedence over everything else, Premier Li Keqiang has also reminded local governments of their “inescapable responsibility” to meet growth targets. Keen not to be perceived as going back to the ‘old China’ ways of pursuing growth for growth’s sake, the stimulus is likely to remain more subtle than the CNY 4trn ‘bazooka’ used in 2008. At the same time, the government has the capacity and policy conviction to see that the growth target of 7-8% is met.
While there have been no broad-brush cuts in reserve requirement ratios or lending rates since 2012, the government and the central bank have been actively easing policy since April (see table below).
A large part of the stimulus since April has been delivered by the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC). The PBoC has the capacity to act quickly – as we saw last week – and can separate itself from some of the Central Government’s reform initiatives.
The table below is far from exhaustive, with local governments in particular having undertaken a number of stimulus activities of their own. However, with the probe into corruption, local governments have been unusually reticent, shying away from highlighting their activities. Nevertheless, policy adjustments to house purchase restrictions for example are likely to go a long way to helping the slowing housing sector see new sources of demand.
The case for more easing
The absence of inflation constraints
The PBoC has substantial capacity to stimulate the economy without raising inflation anywhere near its target of 3.5%. In August inflation slipped to 2.0% from 2.3% in July. Indeed if it is serious about the target, it will need to stimulate demand as it is unlikely that a significant supply-side shock is going to raise inflation to 3.5% in the near-term.
Compensating for shadow-bank deleveraging
While most shadow-banking activities sit within the oversight of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, a small portion does not. Fears of excessive credit growth in the shadow-banking sector has led to pull-back in trust loans (lending by non-bank, deposit taking institutions). Additionally loans that have been taken off balance-sheet by banks (by “undiscounting” bankers’ acceptances) are increasingly being kept on balance sheet. With the onus of credit intermediation falling back on formal banks and with loans remaining on their balance sheet, the PBoC needs to help State banks free-up lending capacity so that credit can be directed to the real economy.
Shadow banks lend and pay depositors on commercial terms, in contrast to many state banks. They arguably direct credit to growing sectors of the economy more efficiently than state banks. If this period of shadow bank deleveraging/banking renaissance continues, loan growth may have to increase more substantially to get credit into the right parts of the economy. The PBoC’s encouragement would therefore be necessary to facilitate this process.
Export growth alone is not enough
Export growth has been surprising strong, while import growth has been relatively muted. While that will help boost GDP figures for the quarter, it is not guaranteed to continue indefinitely.
Indeed with the renminbi appreciating against the dollar, which in turn is appreciating against most other currencies, Chinese exports are getting more expensive for recipient countries
Also lower import growth in China, could hurt demand for Chinese exports from its partner countries, creating a negative feed-back loop.
With China seeking to rebalance its economy away from being an exporter of goods lower down the value chain, the need to stimulate internal demand is clear.
Property markets need micro-targeted policy assistance
As discussed in the August China Macro Monitor, while developers have displayed some cautious optimism by increasing building activity, demand is currently weak as many potential buyers are taking a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. So while captive demand exists with urbanisation continuing unabated, a lack of confidence could contribute to a downward spiral in demand. A decisive policy shock could break this mind-set and avoid the build-up of excess housing. Given that housing supply-demand balances vary widely across provinces and cities, the policy moves will likely have to be carefully targeted with local governments taking the lead in implementation.
China A-Shares continues to rise
Over the past month, the China A-share index has continued to increase, although the soft economic data has capped its gains.
The successful completion of a practice session last weekend will likely see the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect go live in mid-October as planned. We believe that the Connect initiative will allow better arbitrage between the Hong Kong and Shanghai exchanges, narrowing the current premium Hong Kong stocks have over those trading on the mainland (see Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect: A Boost For China A Shares). A-share discounts to H-shares have been steadily narrowing over the past two months, but still stand at 4%.
The application of quotas favours flows to the mainland over outflows to H-Shares in Hong Kong and will increase the number of investors in the China A-share market.
The Connect does not however link up the Shenzhen exchange to Hong Kong and therefore broad China A indices (which track stocks on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges) offer investors a compelling alternative to buying stocks directly
Investors have additionally benefited from yuan appreciation, with the China A Share index priced in US dollars.
While most economic data last month was disappointing, the flash release of HSBC/Markit’s purchasing manager indices for September came in as a positive surprise, indicating a potential increase in industrial activity is on its way. Domestic equity markets reacted positively to the news.
We anticipate as government and central bank easing gradually ratchet up in the coming weeks and months, and foreign investors increasingly focus on the extremely beaten down valuation of the A-shares market relative to major developed equity benchmarks and their own history, that A-Shares will continue to outperform.
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