OPEC members reached an understanding that a production cut is required at its meeting in Algiers yesterday. That is not yet a commitment to cut production and the cartel is likely to wait until its formal meeting in Vienna on November 30th to thrash out the details. A press release on the group’s website says it will target between 32.5 to 33 million barrels per day of production, down from 33.2 million barrels of production in August. Proposed OPEC cuts to have little effect.
The market has cheered the news with more than a 5% increase in Brenton 28th September. However, we caution that the group has to figure out a method of apportioning the cut. The Conference decided to set up a High Level Committee to study the implementation of the production levels of individual Member countries. If formalised, this is the first time the group will assign a quota in close to two years. While the group traditionally (pre-November 2014) had an aggregate target, it had never made individual country targets. Historically, Saudi Arabia was willing to take the burden of supply cuts. But with Iran trying to pump oil at a break-neck pace, Saudi Arabia is less willing to assume this role. Any deal made in November is likely to hinge on the burden being shared across most members (although countries suffering from outages such as Venezuelaand Nigeriamay be exempt). We believe it will be difficult to get Iran to participate in production cuts which could damage the chances of a deal being made in November.
Lastly OPEC is aware that their efforts to stabilse the market may be thwarted by non-OPEC countries efforts to gain market share. Saudi Arabia and Russia have already had discussions on the sidelines of the G20 meeting in China about market stabilisation. It appears that Russia will be willing to participate in this effort, but to what degree is unknown. The Committee seeks to develop a framework of consultations between OPEC and non-OPEC countries before the November OPEC conference.
Capping OPEC production at 33 million barrels in of itself will do little to achieve market balance. We continue to believe that the bulk of the heavy lifting to achieve global market balance will be made by non-OPEC countries cutting supply. US$1trn of capex cuts have been planned in the oil and gas industry which will bite into supply. Additionally, weak prices should support the growth of demand.
We believe that crude will continue to trade in a range of US$40-55/bbl, with nimble tight oil producers in the US playing an influential role in setting the top and bottom of this range.
Nitesh Shah, Research Analyst at ETF Securities
Niteshis a Commodities Strategist at ETF Securities. Nitesh has 13 years of experience as an economist and strategist, covering a wide range of markets and asset classes. Prior to joining ETF Securities, Nitesh was an economist covering the European structured finance markets at Moody’s Investors Service and was a member of Moody’s global macroeconomics team. Before that he was an economist at the Pension Protection Fund and an equity strategist at Decision Economics. He started his career at HSBC Investment Bank. Nitesh holds a Bachelor of Science in Economics from the London School of Economics and a Master of Arts in International Economics and Finance from Brandeis University (USA).
VanEck Unconstrained Emerging Markets Bond – Mixed Signals in Emerging Markets
The market environment remains unsettled. The quality of the macro flow in major economies is still largely uneven (despite a larger number of positive macro surprises in both G10 and EM) and many central banks find themselves in a policy quagmire as additional monetary easing results in stronger currencies and higher interest rates. Markets continue to price in a dovish scenario for the Fed that envisages only two full policy rate hikes in the next three years. Neutral investor positioning (as measured, for example, by the American Association of Individual Investors) is up again. We interpret this as a by-product of tensions between serious macro/policy headwinds and tailwinds. The “tailwinds” cluster includes tentative signs that EM growth might be bottoming out, reasonably strong external accounts in many EMs and the stabilization (at least for now) of China’s international reserves. On the “headwinds” side of the equation we find multiple unresolved issues in Europe, major imbalances in China (possibly made worse by the recent policy moves), a Fed struggling with forward guidance, a massive widening of the EM fiscal gap and deteriorating corporate profitability. It is also worth noting that China’s activity indicators and the external trade numbers softened in the past month. We are also alarmed by the extent of speculation with commodity futures in China.
We think that many tailwinds exist…but will ultimately face headwinds. First, Chinese authorities have managed to slow down capital outflows through official channels. The valuation-adjusted decline in international reserves is now smaller than in November- December 2015. Authorities are also implementing additional measures to prop up growth – mainly through additional credit supply – albeit as we noted the latest activity numbers came below expectations. Possible fiscal stimulus might prop-up GDP growth as well. These factors should reduce the immediate depreciation pressure on CNY and authorities should be able to maintain the existing exchange rate regime for a little longer, alleviating concerns about the impact of CNY devaluation on other emerging currencies (especially in Asia). There are tentative signs (macro surprises, EM PMIs a touch stronger than in December) that the growth outlook in EM stopped deteriorating and additional policy support (if EM FX weakness is contained) might prove crucial for further progress. Limited EM FX weakness is also generally beneficial for the inflation outlook and lower inflation can further boost real interest rates in EM – which already look attractive relative to the past lows and relative to U.S. treasuries. An important aspect of China’s current policy mix is its positive impact (however temporary) on the housing market and, as such, on global commodity prices which should provide additional support to EM FX and external balances. However, the extent of China’s commodity speculation is of course an important question mark.
We also continue to believe that the headwinds abound and are persistent…and are winning for now. Our key concern is that China’s near-term growth/FX relief might come at a price of worsening imbalances which would make any future resolution more problematic. Specifically, the leverage context remains highly worrisome as authorities intend to accelerate money supply (M2 growth). The same applies to a very high bank assets/nominal GDP ratio especially when compared to China’s relatively low per capita GDP. The success of China’s credit boost is questionable given that it now takes four extra units of credit (TSF) to produce one extra unit of nominal GDP. Despite the recent small improvements, both China’s growth slowdown and the decline in international reserves are of historic proportions and the reserve adequacy now looks stretched on several metrics. So, while we acknowledge the recent positive signals coming from China, our longer-term view on China’s economic, policy and political challenges remains unchanged. Another set of concerns relates to the recent fiscal deterioration in EM and rating downgrades it might entail. After several years of stability (2010-2014), the aggregate EM fiscal gap widened sharply in 2015 reaching 3.7% of GDP – the worst in the past 15 years – and consensus expects further deterioration to 4% of GDP in 2016 and only small improvement to 3.5% of GDP in 2017. We doubt that rating agencies would respond kindly to the deterioration and expect further rating/outlook downgrades. Our third set of concerns centers on unresolved European issues. We are now on the final stretch to the Brexit vote in June, while the Grexit problem is resurfacing again and will keep on reappearing unless there are more radical steps taken to reduce the debt burden. The immigration/ refugee issue looks thoroughly mishandled and we should expect a further rise of political extremism. The situation in the European banking sector is murky at best and bank CDS failed to narrow further after the initial declines after the ECB meetings in March and April. There is also growing evidence that negative interest rates are punishing banks. Fourth, corporate profitability is deteriorating and capex spending remains high relative to cash flow from operations. Finally, markets might be pricing in too much of the Fed’s dovishness (only 18bps of hikes are seen in the next 12 months) in a situation when many inflation indicators are picking up. The U.S. growth outlook is likely to improve in Q2 and it appears there is virtually no visible deterioration in the labor market conditions.
The portfolio implications of these developments can be summarized as follows: (1) be nimble and liquid (the unconstrained approach is more important than ever); (2) be aware of the headwinds (we view them as resurgent) and have a reaction function (ours is when China’s property market stalls again and/or the Fed hikes); (3) respect tailwinds in downturns – big and long rallies often happen when things are bad. Specifically, we maintain our defensive positions (around 30% of the portfolio) in hard currency bonds with spread/beta (Argentina and Brazil) and/or with defensive characteristics (Israel and South Korea). We also reduced exposure to local currency denominated bonds (to about 10% of the portfolio). We focus on countries with high real interest rates, with central banks that are not afraid to tighten if necessary and whose currencies were allowed to depreciate during the past risk-off episodes (Argentina, Indonesia and Brazil). Finally, we have exposure to selective EM corporates (about 15% of our portfolio) – we focus on liquid companies that are low beta to the economy and that can benefit from FX weakness through local-currency costs.
Exposure Types and Significant Changes
The changes to our top positions are summarized below. Our largest positions are currently: South Korea, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa.
We added hard currency sovereign exposure in South Korea and Israel. Both countries are high-rated net creditors with solid fiscal and external positions and we regard their hard currency bonds as defensive diversifiers.
We also added hard currency sovereign exposure in Chile, Turkey and the Philippines. The external balances in Chile and Turkey are improving and the external position of the Philippines remains robust. It was also encouraging that the new governor of Turkey’s central bank has not surprised markets on the dovish side during his first monetary policy decision.
We reduced local currency exposure in Peru, Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia, authorities’ failure to resolve the 1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) saga once and for all – with the latest episode genuinely surprising markets – is weighing on local assets. In Peru and Indonesia, local currencies no longer look cheap relative to the underlying commodity prices and in Indonesia there is an additional supply risk.
We also reduced local currency exposure in Mexico and Russia on concerns that they have over-reacted to commodity price stability.
Fund Performance
The Fund (EMBAX) gained 1.28% in April, compared to a 2.17% gain for a 50% local-50% hard-currency index.
The Fund’s biggest winners were Brazil, Argentina, and Indonesia. The Fund’s biggest losers were Russia, Mexicoand Peru.
Turning to the market’s performance, the GBI-EM’s biggest winners were Brazil, Peru and Colombia. The biggest losers were Poland, Romania and China.
The EMBI’s biggest winners were Belize, Venezula and Angola, while its biggest losers were Malaysia, Ivory Coast and China.
†Monthly returns are not annualized.
Please note that the information herein represents the opinion of the portfolio manager and these opinions may change at any time and from time to time.
Diversification does not assure a profit or prevent against a loss.
Expenses: Class A: Gross 1.44%; Net 1.25%. Expenses are capped contractually until 05/01/17 at 1.25% for Class A. Caps exclude certain expenses, such as interest. Please note that, generally, unconstrained bond funds may have higher fees than core bond funds due to the specialized nature of their strategies.
The tables above present past performance which is no guarantee of future results and which may be lower or higher than current performance. Returns reflect applicable fee waivers and/or expense reimbursements. Had the Fund incurred all expenses and fees, investment returns would have been reduced. Investment returns and Fund share values will fluctuate so that investors’ shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Fund returns assume that dividends and capital gains distributions have been reinvested in the Fund at Net Asset Value (NAV). Index returns assume that dividends of the index constituents have been reinvested. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal; please see disclaimers on next page. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance current to the most recent month ended.
11 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) is a strategic development company, wholly owned by the Government of Malaysia. The G10 currencies are 10 of the most heavily traded currencies in the world.
Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rate changes that reflects the change in a bond’s price given a change in yield. This duration measure is appropriate for bonds with embedded options. Quantitative Easing by a central bank increases the money supply engaging in open market operations in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity. Monetary Easing is an economic tool employed by a central bank to reduce interest rates and increase money supply in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Correlation is a statistical measure of how two variables move in relation to one other. Liquidity Illusion refers to the effect that an independent variable might have in the liquidity of a security as such variable fluctuates overtime. A Holdouts Issue in the fixed income asset class occurs when a bond issuing country or entity is in default or at the brink of default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure its debt held by existing bond holding investors.
Emerging Markets Hard Currency Bonds refers to bonds denominated in currencies that are generally widely accepted around the world (such as the U.S.-Dollar, Euro or Yen). Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds are bonds denominated in the local currency of the issuer. Emerging Markets Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by national governments of emerging countries in order to finance a country’s growth. Emerging Markets Quasi- Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by corporations domiciled in emerging countries that are either 100% government owned or whose debts are 100% government guaranteed. Emerging Markets Corporate Bonds are bonds issued by non-government owned corporations that are domiciled in emerging countries.
All indices are unmanaged and include the reinvestment of all dividends, but do not reflect the payment of transaction costs, advisory fees or expenses that are associated with an investment in the Fund. An index’s performance is not illustrative of the Fund’s performance. Indices are not se¬curities in which investments can be made. The 50/50 benchmark (the “Index”) is a blended index consisting of 50% J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified and 50% J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM). The J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM) tracks local currency bonds issued by Emerging Markets governments. The index spans over 15 countries. J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified tracks returns for actively traded external debt in¬struments in emerging markets, and is also J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S-dollar emerging markets debt benchmark. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Country Currency Index (EMCI) is a tradable benchmark for emerging markets currencies versus the U.S. Dollar (USD). The Index compromises 10 currencies: BRL, CLP, CNH, HUF, INR, MXN, RUB, SGD, TRY and ZAR. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is an indicator designed to measure consumer confidence, which is defined as the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers are expressing through their activities of savings and spending.
Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but J.P. Morgan does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The Index is used with permission. The index may not be copied, used or distributed without J.P. Morgan’s written approval. Copyright 2014, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.
Investing involves risk, including loss of principal. You can lose money by investing in the Fund. Any investment in the Fund should be part of an over¬all investment program, not a complete program. The Fund is subject to risks associated with its investments in emerging markets securities. Investing in foreign denominated and/or domiciled securities may involve heightened risk due to currency fluctuations, and economic and political risks, which may be enhanced in emerging markets. As the Fund may invest in securities denominated in foreign currencies and some of the income received by the Fund will be in foreign currencies, changes in currency exchange rates may negatively impact the Fund’s return. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. The Fund may also be subject to credit risk, interest rate risk, sovereign debt risk, tax risk, non-diversification risk and risks associated with non-invest¬ment grade securities. Please see the prospectus and summary prospectus for information on these and other risk considerations.
Investors should consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, and charges and expenses carefully before investing. Bond and bond funds will decrease in value as interest rates rise. The prospectus and summary prospectus contain this as well as other information. Please read them carefully before investing. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance information current to the most recent month end and for a free prospectus and summary prospectus.
Oil needs more than a Venezuelan default Judging by CDS spreads, the market fears Venezuela is approaching default (at a 25% recovery, the market is pricing in a 98% probability of default!).
Surprisingly, despite the fact that Venezuela has not let the IMF in to the country to perform its annual assessment (Article IV consultation) since 2004, the Venezuelan government has managed to access the bond markets, with approximately US$100bn of debts outstanding. Worryingly, about a fifth of the government debt (US$21bn) is due within the next three years.
(Click to enlarge) Source: Bloomberg, ETF Securities
Venezuela controls the largest proved reserves of oil in the world (around 18%), and produces around 3% of global supplies (similar scale to Mexico). Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company is fully controlled by the government. They have a symbiotic relationship: the government relies on PDVSA for more than half of formal budget revenues and PDVSA is reliant on the government for access to the oil reserves and its relationships with creditor countries such as China. PDVSA has also issued bonds of its own, with total outstanding debts of US$50bn adding to the contingent obligations of the government.
Even though PDVSA and the government are two separate issuers and so PDVSA’s assets cannot be considered collateral by sovereign bondholders, PDVSA will likely face funding difficulties. Any attempt by the government to access more of the PDVSA’s revenues, will leave less resources for PDVSA’s bondholders and market access is likely to close very quickly.
A disruption to Venezuelan supply could tighten global oil markets. However, current global oversupply is around 2.3 million barrels per day according to International Energy Agency data. It is unlikely that all 2.6 million barrels per day of Venezuelan supply will be wiped out overnight. When Mexico defaulted in 1982, its oil production fell by only 8% and that took four years. In the initial phases of a default the Venezuelan government would likely want to work its oil assets even harder to finance itself. Therefore, we believe that to bring the global oil market into balance broader production cuts will be required by both OPEC and non-OPEC members.
For more information contact:
ETF Securities Research team
ETF Securities (UK) Limited
T +44 (0) 207 448 4336
E infoUK@etfsecurities.com
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Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges
Van Eck Unconstrained Emerging Markets Bond Fund
Manager Commentary – Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges
By: Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager
November 2015
Executive Summary
Emerging markets (EM) debt still facing many headwinds
Strong idyosincratic drivers in Argentina, Venezuela and Russia
EM real rates remain low by historic standards
Overview
We still see many headwinds for EM debt including, but not limited to, the possible upcoming Federal Reserve (Fed) rate hikes, a looming potential devaluation in China, unstable commodity prices, a still weak EM growth trajectory, inflation risk, implosion in Brazil and potentially approaching troubles in Turkey. Regarding the Fed, just as the market was consistently mispricing the timing of their first hike relative to “dots” implied timing, the same seems to be occurring for the timing and magnitude of the anticipated subsequent rate hikes…fasten your duration seatbelts, in our opinion. Despite China telling the world that its currency devaluation will happen someday, it did not trigger capital flight. Shouldn’t the usual rule of thumb on devaluations apply, namely, you do them big and early in conjunction with some real or pretend reforms? How does it not get worse the longer China waits? It is maintaining a currency peg while cutting rates, making it cheaper for investors to short the currency. Furthermore, the rapidly approaching Fed hike means a tighter policy in China, via the exchange rate peg, in a time of declining growth rates for an exporting economy. The risks of unstable or weak commodity prices seem high. Brazil remains in the grips of a vicious political and economic adverse feedback loop of worse outcomes (e.g., recession) creating divisive politics and policy paralysis. Turkey does not seem to be a market concern, but we think it should be. President Erdogan is about to complete his takeover of state institutions which includes the likely departure of the current central bank head. The policy implication could be a central bank easing policy, risking currency weakness and self-fulfilling inflation expectations. Additionally, they may be tempted to intervene in the currency market, threatening their already-low reserves.
But, we think there are still investments that can outperform in the face of these risks. Our portfolio could be thought of as consisting of two halves: idiosyncratic and defensive. The idiosyncratic portion is primarily composed of Argentina and Venezuela dollar-denominated bonds, and both Russia rouble- and dollar-denominated bonds. As the term idiosyncratic implies, we see asset price performance almost entirely based on country-specific factors rather than systematic factors such as U.S. interest rates, etc. In Argentina, the idiosyncratic driver is the new government’s likely settlement with its holdout creditors, while in Venezuela, government bonds are trading near recovery value. In Russia, the idiosyncratic driver for local-currency bonds is declining inflation. The defensive half of the portfolio is made up of some high-spread dollar-denominated short-dated bonds with cheap spreads relative to fundamentals. The spread duration is such that if one is correct, the reward would be the constant carry. One of the largest allocations is to low duration dollar-denominated bonds in South Korea, which is experiencing ongoing balance of payments surpluses and can perform defensively in risk-off scenarios.
Why focus on Argentina and Venezuela as key idiosyncratic diversifiers? We have long maintained that the November presidential elections in Argentina would result in a more market-friendly government than the one established under former President Cristina Kirchner. The election victory of the opposition candidate Mauricio Macri – which was not an obvious outcome even a couple of months ago – might be a real game-changer. The new government’s line-up is very impressive, and so far, Macri has been sticking to his pre-election promises of dealing with the existing imbalances, such as multiple exchange rates, in a timely fashion. The Macri administration is also likely to bring in the resolution of the holdouts situation, paving the way for Argentina’s eventual rating upgrade to single-‘B’. We consider it a good sign that in late November Moody’s changed Argentina’s outlook to positive. The bottom line is that the country is solvent, but it currently has no market access, which should change when the holdouts issue is resolved. This is now a more likely outcome, in our opinion. Venezuela’s macro outlook remains very challenging but markets continue to price in an extremely high chance of default under our recovery value assumptions. Our position is that 100% probabilities of default, in general, are to be viewed skeptically. It remains to be seen whether the National Assembly elections on December 6 will bring in meaningful policy changes or closer relations with the U.S. – but there are several very low-hanging policy “fruits” (such as higher gasoline prices, streamlining the exchange rate system) that can reduce imbalances if there is enough political will.
Why a less negative perspective on Russia? First, Russia is emerging in a new light following the Paris tragedy and the shooting down of its military plane by Turkey. We think that appetite for an escalation of sanctions against Russia in this new environment is low. The rating agencies have already noted that the improving relations between Russia and the U.S. may boost Russia’s rating. Second, the authorities’ response to a considerable deterioration in the external conditions following the introduction of sanctions was surprisingly orthodox and helped avoid a major drain on reserves. Russia seems to be emerging from this episode with a stronger credit profile (e.g., stable reserves, lower external debt, a larger current account surplus). Third, the rouble was used mainly as a shock-absorber in the past months and is now significantly undervalued both on a short-term basis and also when looking at fundamental metrics. Additionally, a major disinflation move is expected in the next 3-6 months allowing the central bank to ease further. All this makes us more comfortable owning non-sanctioned Russia securities (sovereigns [OFZs] and hard-currency quasi-sovereign debt). Fourth, duration makes the trade attractive, in our opinion. Inflation could decline to 6% by the end of 2016 with the policy rate (and yield curve) around 10%. So, with carry and duration, we are looking at rates that are possibly 100bp-200bp lower, which may provide a cushion for potential currency weakness.
Why still unable to find attractive local currency? First, even though real interest rates in emerging markets increased in the past few weeks, they remain low by historic standards and also in comparison to real rates in developed markets (real interest rates in the U.S. have recovered to their long-term average). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) continues to give strong signals that it is ready to hike in December. Such a move might not only pull nominal yields in the U.S. (at least in the near term) but also real rates in emerging markets. Second, with the renminbi in November finally becoming part of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, an international reserve asset which is based on the values of major currencies, the focus is now shifting to possible currency devaluation in China and its potential impact on the rest of EM FX (both in terms of the initial knee-jerk reaction and the subsequent rounds of “currency wars”). The offshore currency (CNH) is weakening relative to the controlled onshore currency (CNY). Third, even though there were some improvements in the EM macro data flow in the past weeks, we have yet to see any meaningful improvement in the EM growth outlook. Consensus continues to downgrade the 2016 growth forecasts in all EM regions – reflecting debt overhang and low commodity prices among other things. The expected growth differential between EM and the U.S. continues to narrow down, undermining the fundamental support for EM FX. We should note the potential for contagion risk in Brazil and Turkey perhaps, due to the size and importance of their economies.
A key feature of the intial steps of our investment process compares the risk premium of a country to its fundamentals) and we should emphasize that it does uncover pockets of value in local-currency markets. Colombia, Brazil, Zambia, Nigeria and others pay high real interest rates. However, in each of these cases, these investments failed the following step of our process which test specific risk factors. Colombia has been very correlated to oil prices, and we expect it will continue to be, and thus the failed correlation test, Brazil fails the policy/politics test, and Zambia and Nigeria are slowly moving to capital control regimes, in our opinion, and therefore, fail the policy/politics tests.
Exposure Types and Significant Changes The changes to our top positions are summarized below. Our largest positions are currently: South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa and Russia.
We added local-currency sovereign and hard-currency quasi-sovereign debt exposure in Russia. We expect to benefit from a combination of a change in the geopolitical narrative that reduces the potential risk of additional sanctions and disinflation that should allow the central bank to further slash interest rates.
We reduced sovereign and quasi-sovereign hard-currency debt exposure in Chile due to concerns about the price of copper in light of the ongoing growth slowdown in China.
We also reduced local-currency sovereign exposure in Romania due to concerns about local politics and policy noise.
We reduced hard-currency sovereign exposure in Israel due to greater vulnerability risks as well as concerns about duration. We also reduced quasi-sovereign hard-currency exposure in Vietnam on greater vulnerability risks.
Fund Performance
The Fund (EMBAX) gained 0.13% in November, compared to a 1.11% loss for a 50% local-50% hard-currency index.
The Fund’s biggest winners were Venezuela (hard-currency sovereign), South Africa (hard currency sovereign and quasi-sovereign) and Ivory Coast (hard-currency sovereign). The Fund’s biggest losers were Argentina (hard-currency sovereign), Romania (local-currency sovereign) and Mongolia (hard-currency sovereign).
Turning to the market’s performance, the GBI-EM’s biggest winners were Nigeria, Brazil and Indonesia. The biggest losers were Colombia, South Africa and Hungary – with Colombia and South Africa affected by low commodity prices and policy rate hikes.
The EMBI’s biggest winners were Venezuela, Kazakhstan and Malaysia, while its biggest losers were Egypt, Chile and Mongolia (with the latter two affected by concerns about the price of copper).
Diversification does not assure a profit or prevent against a loss.
Expenses: Class A: Gross 1.32%; Net 1.25%. Expenses are capped contractually until 05/01/16 at 1.25% for Class A. Caps exclude certain expenses, such as interest. Please note that, generally, unconstrained bond funds may have higher fees than core bond funds due to the specialized nature of their strategies. The tables above present past performance which is no guarantee of future results and which may be lower or higher than current performance. Returns reflect applicable fee waivers and/or expense reimbursements. Had the Fund incurred all expenses and fees, investment returns would have been reduced. Investment returns and Fund share values will fluctuate so that investors’ shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Fund returns assume that dividends and capital gains distributions have been reinvested in the Fund at Net Asset Value (NAV). Index returns assume that dividends of the index constituents have been reinvested. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal; please see disclaimers on next page. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance current to the most recent month ended.
Data Sources: Van Eck Research, FactSet. All portfolio weightings and statements herein as of November 30, 2015. Unless otherwise indicated.
Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rate changes that reflects the change in a bond’s price given a change in yield. This duration measure is appropriate for bonds with embedded options. Quantitative Easing by a central bank increases the money supply engaging in open market operations in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity. Monetary Easing is an economic tool employed by a central bank to reduce interest rates and increase money supply in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Correlation is a statistical measure of how two variables move in relation to one other. Liquidity Illusion refers to the effect that an independent variable might have in the liquidity of a security as such variable fluctuates overtime. A Holdouts Issue in the fixed income asset class occurs when a bond issuing country or entity is in default or at the brink of default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure its debt held by existing bond holding investors.
Emerging Markets Hard Currency Bonds refers to bonds denominated in currencies that are generally widely accepted around the world (such as the U.S.-Dollar, Euro or Yen). Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds are bonds denominated in the local currency of the issuer. Emerging Markets Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by national governments of emerging countries in order to finance a country’s growth. Emerging Markets Quasi-Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by corporations domiciled in emerging countries that are either 100% government owned or whose debts are 100% government guaranteed. Emerging Markets Corporate Bonds are bonds issued by non-government owned corporations that are domiciled in emerging countries. A Supranational is an international organization, or union, whose members transcend national boundaries and share in the decision-making. Examples of supranationals are: World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for the euro and administers monetary policy of the Eurozone, which consists of 19 EU member states and is one of the largest currency areas in the world. The Labor Market Conditions Index (LMCI) is a dynamic factor model index that combines 19 labor market indicators to provide an assessment of overall labor market conditions. The Employment Cost Index tracks the changes in the costs of labor for businesses in the United States economy.
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Det här är varför oljepriset kommer att fortsätta att falla
Efter att ha fortsatt med att studsa runt så avslutade oljepriset veckan med en något lägre volatilitet än vad det hade i förra måndagen. Priset på WTI stannade på 46 USD per fat i fredags och Brent håller sig fortfarande på ”rätt sida” 50 USD per fat. Utöver utbud och efterfrågan samt fundamenta på oljemarknaderna är centralbankernas policy en annan viktig faktor som styr prissättningen på denna energiråvara. Den europeiska centralbanken, ECB, har sagt att den anser att det kanske behövs ytterligare penningpolitisk stimulans för att sätta fart på den stagnerande europeiska ekonomin. Detta uttalande ledde till att oljepriset steg. Aktörerna på oljemarknaderna väntar emellertid på ett viktigare tillkännagivande, om den amerikanska centralbanken FED kommer att höja den amerikanska referensräntan. Under sommaren har vi sett en del händelser som lett till oro på aktiemarknaderna världen över, till exempel den grekiska skuldkriser, GREXIT, och en härdsmälta på den kinesiska aktiemarknaden vilket har tonat ned sannolikheten för en räntehöjning i USA. Det här är varför oljepriset kommer att fortsätta att falla
Oro på de amerikanska börserna
Den allmänna ekonomiska oron har börjat nå de amerikanska börserna. Den 4 september publicerade den amerikanska regeringen data för augusti månad som visar att den amerikanska ekonomin endast adderat 173 000 nya arbetstillfällen, en siffra som var långt under förväntningarna. Det är för tidigt att uttala sig om detta är en avmattning av den amerikanska konjunkturen, något som är av ondo för oljepriset. Denna statistik kan emellertid komma att leda till att FED avvaktar med att höja räntan, vilket i sin tur kan komma att leda till högre priser på både Brent och WTI.
Ännu värre i Kanada
I Kanada ser vi att allt fler av de kanadensiska oljesandsprojekten har avbrutits som en följd av de låga oljepriserna. Det är emellertid viktigt att notera att flera projekt lades ned eller var på gång att läggas ned redan innan den senaste stora nedgången i oljepriset. Kostnaderna för att stänga ned dessa projekt är höga, och flera operatörer väljer att fortsätta med sin produktion då det faktiskt är billigare att förlora pengar på produktionen på kort sikt än att ta en stor kostnad för att stänga ned dem. Produktionen från dessa projekt kommer att nå marknaden senaste 2017, vilket kommer att addera ytterligare en halv miljon fat per dag till utbudet. Redan i dag ser vi hur den kanadensiska oljan handlas med en rabatt mot den amerikanska oljan WTI, en rabatt som periodvis ligger så pass hög som 15 USD per fat.
Detta betyder att medan den amerikanska oljan WTI föll under 40 USD per fat så handlades West Canada Select till 20 USD per fat. Efter den senaste återhämtningen ligger ett fat WCS på 30 USD per fat. Break even för många av de kanadensiska oljesandsprojekten ligger på cirka 80 USD per fat. Skillnaden mot skiffergas/skifferoljeprojekten världen över är att den kanadensiska oljesanden kan leverera energi i årtionden framöver när det går att räkna hem projekten ekonomiskt. Tyvärr finns det få tecken som tyder på att vi kommer att få se en uppgång i oljepriserna inom en snar framtid varför oljesandsprojekten kommer att få se en besvärlig kursutveckling framöver. Till och med BP har nedgraderats av Bank of America som sätter underperform på aktien och varnar för att detta oljebolag kommer att få svårt att uppfylla sin utdelningspolicy.
Kommer exportförbudet tas bort?
EIA släppte under förra veckan en rapport som visade att det kommer att få en låg effekt på de amerikanska bensinpriserna om USAs regering upphäver förbudet mot råoljeexport. Faktum är att studien visar att bensinpriserna kan komma att sjunka då de raffinerade produkternas pris styrs alltmer av priset på Brent än av WTI-priset. Det betyder att om exportförbudet av WTI upphör kommer det att finnas allt mer olja på den globala marknaden, något som i sin tur skulle pressa ned priset på Brent ytterligare. EIAs studie visar att om exportförbudet tas bort kan det komma att leda till att raffineringsindustrin förlorar 22 miljarder dollar per år.
Hittills många medlemmar av kongressen har varit ovilliga att ta ställning för eller emot exportförbudet eftersom det ställer borrföretagen mot raffineringsindustrin som båda är starka politiska aktörer. Då det enligt rapporten inte kommer att bli fråga om stigande oljepriser är det sannolikt att oljeindustrin kan få en del allierade i sina försöka att få exportförbudet hävt. Det finns emellertid ett stort problem, det amerikanska presidentvalet 2016 vilket kan göra det svårt att få till stånd en ändring i den amerikanska energilagstiftningen. Det kan komma att skjutas på framtiden.
Saudiarabien för diskussioner med USA
Saudiarabiens kung Salman anlände till Washington den 4 september för att möta USAs president Barack Obama. De två statscheferna kommer att diskutera kärnvapenfrågan i Iran, en uppgörelse som den saudiska kungen starkt motsatte sig initialt men som han sedan började acceptera efter en rad löften från USA. Om de två statscheferna kan enas om detta kommer de sedan att tala om konflikterna i Syrien och i Jemen. Det finns emellertid små eller kanske rentav inga utsikter att så pass komplicerade konflikter kommer att kunna få en lösning inom en snar framtid så kung Salmans resa bör betraktas som ett sätt att bygga förtroende mellan de två länderna. Saudiarabien har historiskt sett varit en stark allianspartner till USA, men det har skapats en del misstro länderna emellan sedan USA tinade upp relationerna till Iran.
Ett oljeutsläpp stängt en del av Mississippifloden efter det att två bogserbåtar kolliderade i slutet av förra veckan. En av båtarna transporterade slamolja som nu läckt ut i floden, och en av de brustna tankarna hade en last på 250 000 liter. Kustbevakningen arbetar med båtens ägare – Inland Marine Services – för att fastställa omfattningen av skadorna.
Ryssland träffar Venezuela i Kina
Även andra statschefer är oroade över det låga oljepriset. Rysslands president Vladimir Putin träffade Venezuelas president Nicolas Maduro i Kina förra veckan och diskuterade olika sätt att stabilisera oljepriset. De två statschefer kom överens om att ta tag i frågan om de låga oljepriserna, men de har ännu inte meddelat omvärlden mer än så. Vi anser att deras deltagande är att betrakta som mycket hoppfullt då ingen av dessa länder har kapacitet att minska sin oljeproduktion eftersom de låga oljepriserna gjort att dessa två länder står inför en ekonomisk och finansiell kris.
Tidigare i veckan steg emellertid oljepriserna på nyheten om att Ryssland sagt sig villigt att förhandla om samordnade åtgärder. Franska EDF meddelade sedan ytterligare förseningar vid sin reaktor Flamanville, Frankrikes första kärnreaktor i mer än 15 år. Reaktorn var tänkt att vara klar 2012 till en kostnad av 3,3 miljarder euro. Ett antal förseningar har gjort att startdatumet nu flyttats fram till slutet av 2018 och att kostnaderna kommer att närma sig elva miljarder euro. Förseningarna är ett välbekant problem med den nya generationen av kärnreaktorer, precis som de var med de tidigare modellerna. Kärnkraftsbyggen är komplext och förseningar är vanliga samtidigt som kostnadsöverskridanden har plågat industrin, och varje bakslag skadar teknikens konkurrenskraft. När industriländerna byggde sina första kärnkraftsanläggningar på 1960. 1970- och 1980-talet fanns få andra alternativ. I dag konkurrerar de med billig naturgas och förnyelsebar energi vilket gör att det inte finns utrymme för misstag och förseningar.
