Oljepriset darrar när OPEC misslyckas att nå samförstånd
De börshandlade fonder till exempel United States Oil Fund (NYSEArca: USO) och United States Brent Oil Fund (NYSEArca: BNO), som replikerar oljeprisethalkade något efter det att the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, i förra veckan misslyckades med att kommer överens om ett produktionstak och att Iran meddelade att landet planerar att pumpa upp ännu mera råolja. Oljepriset darrar när OPEC misslyckas att nå samförstånd.
Vissa medlemmar i OPEC försökte att sätta ett nytt kollektiv produktionstak i ett försök att stödja priserna, men detta till trots avslutades torsdagens möte utan att någon ny politik eller ett nytt produktionstak men med ett visst motstånd från Iran.
Saudiarabien försökte mildra effekten och lovade att inte översvämma marknaden med olja. Saudiarabiens nya energiminister, Khalid al-Falih, sade till nyhetsbyrån Reuters att landet kommer att vara mycket försiktigt i sin strategi och se till att inte chocka marknaden på något sätt. Han säger att det finns ingen anledning att förvänta sig att Saudiarabienkommer att delta i en kampanj som kommer att översvämma marknaderna med råolja.
Saudiarabien har tidigare sagt att det skulle bli et produktionstak om Iran var villigt att komma överens om att stävja utgången. Emellertid har Teheran hävdat att Iran bör tillåtas att öka produktionen till tidigare nivåer, före införandet av de västerländska sanktionerna för Irans kärnenergiprogram, och valde istället att argumentera för enskilda länder produktionskvoter.
Marknadsbedömarna tror följaktligen tror att oförmågan att nå en överenskommelse återspeglar de politiska skillnader som undergräver organisationen, särskilt mellan sunni-ledda länder och den shiitiska islamiska republiken.
Detta är på kort sikt negativt för oljepriset, men det är också viktigt att komma ihåg att saudierna inte planerar att översvämma marknaden. Dessutom har fundamenta förbättrats för energimarknaden. Bland annat har länder som Indien och USA, båda stora konsumenter, sett en ökad efterfrågan på olja. På utbudssidan har den amerikanska skifferproduktion fallit bort som svar på de kollapsade priser, och producenter som Nigeriaoch Kanada har upplevt störningar i sin produktion.
United States Oil Fund (NYSEArca: USO)
Investeringen syftar till att återspegla resultatet, minus kostnader, av spotpriset på West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light, sweet crude oil. Fonden kommer att investera i terminskontrakt för light, sweet crude oil, andra typer av råolja , diesel-eldningsolja , bensin, naturgas och andra petroleumbaserade bränslen som handlas på NYMEX, ICE Futures Exchange eller andra USA och utländska börser.
Nigerias aktiemarknad rusar efter att centralbankens lättnader
Under förra veckan kunde vi se hur Nigerias aktiemarknad rusar efter att centralbankens lättnader. När börsen i Nigeriarusar så stiger även värdet på Global X Nigeria Index ETF (NYSArca: NGE), den landspecifika börshandlade fond som replikerar Nigerias aktiemarknad. NGE steg med mer än tio (10) procent och rusade förbi sitt 200-dagars glidande medelvärde underifrån. Under det senaste kvartalet har NGE som replikerar detta afrikanska lands aktiemarknad stigit med 25 procent. Sedan årets början rapporterar NGE emellertid en mer modest värdeökning, 4,5 procent.
Stärks efter centralbankens lättnader
De nigerianska aktierna har stärks under de senaste dagarna efter det att landets centralbank på tisdagen sade att den skulle anta en flexibel växelkurspolitik samt upphöra med valutakontrollerna som har legat som en våt filt över Nigerias aktiemarknad. I dag är landets valuta, nairan, övervärderad på grund av att den varit peggad, vilket har fått negativa effekter på både tillväxten och investeringarna i Nigeria. Utländska investerare har under lång tid sett att en devalvering varit oundviklig, och har därför avvaktat med att investera samt sålt sina nigerianska aktier. Efter det att Nigerias centralbank meddelat att den kommer vidta stora förändringar är det sannolikt att dessa kommer att ge sig in på aktiemarknaden igen.
Fortfarande under utarbetande
Centralbankschef Godwin Emefiele sade detaljerna om den nya politiken fortfarande under utarbetande och skall släppas ”under de närmaste dagarna”. Nigeria är en så kallad gränsmarknad, också benämnd frontier market. Landets ekonomi har tyngts hårt av det fallande oljepriset eftersom denna råvara svarar för 70 procent av Nigerias nationalinkomst.
Nigerias bruttonationalprodukt krympte under det första kvartalet 2016 för första gången sedan 2004, en direkt följd av att tillverkarna har haft problem med att köpa råvaror och utrustning. Detta gör att det trots centralbankens lättnader finns en viss risk för att Nigeria är på väg in i en ”överhängande ” recession. Centralbankschefen tillskriver sina pessimistiska utsikter för den sena budgeten för 2016 och tillbakadragandet av en tidigare version av samma budget som ett svar på nedgången i råoljepriserna och internt käbbel mellan olika departement över deras tilldelningar.
Massor av landsspecifika börshandlade fonder har drabbats av oljeprisets fall, här är ännu en ETF som har krossats av oljepriset. Bland de länder som brukar kallas för emerging marketshar de börshandlade fonder som replikerar utvecklingen av den ryska aktiemarknaden haft svårt att rapportera några positiva nyheter då oljepriset fortsatt att kämpa. Bland de ETFer som följer utvecklingen av utvecklade marknaderna är de börshandlade fonder som replikerar utvecklingen av Kanadasaktiemarknad ett utmärkt exempel på den förödelse svaga oljepriserna kan orsaka.
Aktier på gränsmarknader och de börshandlade fonder som replikerar utvecklingen av så kallade frontier markets har också straffats hårt av det fallande oljepriset. Global X Nigeria Index ETF (NYSArca: NGE) är ett häpnadsväckande exempel på den trenden. Denna landsspecifika börshandlade fond som replikerar utvecklingen i Afrikas största oljeproducent har rasat med 36 procent under 2015. Kombinationen av en svagare Energy Outlook och deprecierande valutor skrämmer bort utländska investeringar.
Som medlem i Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) och en av de två största afrikanska oljeproducerande länderna är Nigeria särskilt känsliga för oljeprisrörelser. Detta har även slagit hårt mot NGE trots att denna ETF inte har någon större exponering mot energisektorn. Energiaktier stod för endast 9,5 procent av NGEs vikt vid utgången av juni, vilket gör koncernen denna börshandlade fonds fjärde största sektor enligt data från Global X.
Afrikas största oljeproducent är i trubbel
Afrikas största oljeproducent är i trubbel. Olja står för ungefär 75 procent av Nigerias statliga intäkter, och nästan 90 procent av landets export. Oljeprisets djupdykning har gjort att Nigerias regering inte kan betala sin räkningar, och enligt lokala medier har statliga anställda inte fått lön på flera månader. Samtidigt lider Nigeriaironiskt nog av återkommande elavbrott och bränslebrist.
Som den tolfte största oljeproducenten i världen och världens åttonde största exportör är Nigeria hem till världens tionde största bevisade råreserver med olja som i sin tur svarar för 40 procent av Nigerias BNP och 80 procent av de offentliga intäkterna.
Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges
Van Eck Unconstrained Emerging Markets Bond Fund
Manager Commentary – Opportunities Exist in Emerging Markets Despite Challenges
By: Eric Fine, Portfolio Manager
November 2015
Executive Summary
Emerging markets (EM) debt still facing many headwinds
Strong idyosincratic drivers in Argentina, Venezuela and Russia
EM real rates remain low by historic standards
Overview
We still see many headwinds for EM debt including, but not limited to, the possible upcoming Federal Reserve (Fed) rate hikes, a looming potential devaluation in China, unstable commodity prices, a still weak EM growth trajectory, inflation risk, implosion in Brazil and potentially approaching troubles in Turkey. Regarding the Fed, just as the market was consistently mispricing the timing of their first hike relative to “dots” implied timing, the same seems to be occurring for the timing and magnitude of the anticipated subsequent rate hikes…fasten your duration seatbelts, in our opinion. Despite China telling the world that its currency devaluation will happen someday, it did not trigger capital flight. Shouldn’t the usual rule of thumb on devaluations apply, namely, you do them big and early in conjunction with some real or pretend reforms? How does it not get worse the longer China waits? It is maintaining a currency peg while cutting rates, making it cheaper for investors to short the currency. Furthermore, the rapidly approaching Fed hike means a tighter policy in China, via the exchange rate peg, in a time of declining growth rates for an exporting economy. The risks of unstable or weak commodity prices seem high. Brazil remains in the grips of a vicious political and economic adverse feedback loop of worse outcomes (e.g., recession) creating divisive politics and policy paralysis. Turkey does not seem to be a market concern, but we think it should be. President Erdogan is about to complete his takeover of state institutions which includes the likely departure of the current central bank head. The policy implication could be a central bank easing policy, risking currency weakness and self-fulfilling inflation expectations. Additionally, they may be tempted to intervene in the currency market, threatening their already-low reserves.
But, we think there are still investments that can outperform in the face of these risks. Our portfolio could be thought of as consisting of two halves: idiosyncratic and defensive. The idiosyncratic portion is primarily composed of Argentina and Venezuela dollar-denominated bonds, and both Russia rouble- and dollar-denominated bonds. As the term idiosyncratic implies, we see asset price performance almost entirely based on country-specific factors rather than systematic factors such as U.S. interest rates, etc. In Argentina, the idiosyncratic driver is the new government’s likely settlement with its holdout creditors, while in Venezuela, government bonds are trading near recovery value. In Russia, the idiosyncratic driver for local-currency bonds is declining inflation. The defensive half of the portfolio is made up of some high-spread dollar-denominated short-dated bonds with cheap spreads relative to fundamentals. The spread duration is such that if one is correct, the reward would be the constant carry. One of the largest allocations is to low duration dollar-denominated bonds in South Korea, which is experiencing ongoing balance of payments surpluses and can perform defensively in risk-off scenarios.
Why focus on Argentina and Venezuela as key idiosyncratic diversifiers? We have long maintained that the November presidential elections in Argentina would result in a more market-friendly government than the one established under former President Cristina Kirchner. The election victory of the opposition candidate Mauricio Macri – which was not an obvious outcome even a couple of months ago – might be a real game-changer. The new government’s line-up is very impressive, and so far, Macri has been sticking to his pre-election promises of dealing with the existing imbalances, such as multiple exchange rates, in a timely fashion. The Macri administration is also likely to bring in the resolution of the holdouts situation, paving the way for Argentina’s eventual rating upgrade to single-‘B’. We consider it a good sign that in late November Moody’s changed Argentina’s outlook to positive. The bottom line is that the country is solvent, but it currently has no market access, which should change when the holdouts issue is resolved. This is now a more likely outcome, in our opinion. Venezuela’s macro outlook remains very challenging but markets continue to price in an extremely high chance of default under our recovery value assumptions. Our position is that 100% probabilities of default, in general, are to be viewed skeptically. It remains to be seen whether the National Assembly elections on December 6 will bring in meaningful policy changes or closer relations with the U.S. – but there are several very low-hanging policy “fruits” (such as higher gasoline prices, streamlining the exchange rate system) that can reduce imbalances if there is enough political will.
Why a less negative perspective on Russia? First, Russia is emerging in a new light following the Paris tragedy and the shooting down of its military plane by Turkey. We think that appetite for an escalation of sanctions against Russia in this new environment is low. The rating agencies have already noted that the improving relations between Russia and the U.S. may boost Russia’s rating. Second, the authorities’ response to a considerable deterioration in the external conditions following the introduction of sanctions was surprisingly orthodox and helped avoid a major drain on reserves. Russia seems to be emerging from this episode with a stronger credit profile (e.g., stable reserves, lower external debt, a larger current account surplus). Third, the rouble was used mainly as a shock-absorber in the past months and is now significantly undervalued both on a short-term basis and also when looking at fundamental metrics. Additionally, a major disinflation move is expected in the next 3-6 months allowing the central bank to ease further. All this makes us more comfortable owning non-sanctioned Russia securities (sovereigns [OFZs] and hard-currency quasi-sovereign debt). Fourth, duration makes the trade attractive, in our opinion. Inflation could decline to 6% by the end of 2016 with the policy rate (and yield curve) around 10%. So, with carry and duration, we are looking at rates that are possibly 100bp-200bp lower, which may provide a cushion for potential currency weakness.
Why still unable to find attractive local currency? First, even though real interest rates in emerging markets increased in the past few weeks, they remain low by historic standards and also in comparison to real rates in developed markets (real interest rates in the U.S. have recovered to their long-term average). The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) continues to give strong signals that it is ready to hike in December. Such a move might not only pull nominal yields in the U.S. (at least in the near term) but also real rates in emerging markets. Second, with the renminbi in November finally becoming part of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, an international reserve asset which is based on the values of major currencies, the focus is now shifting to possible currency devaluation in China and its potential impact on the rest of EM FX (both in terms of the initial knee-jerk reaction and the subsequent rounds of “currency wars”). The offshore currency (CNH) is weakening relative to the controlled onshore currency (CNY). Third, even though there were some improvements in the EM macro data flow in the past weeks, we have yet to see any meaningful improvement in the EM growth outlook. Consensus continues to downgrade the 2016 growth forecasts in all EM regions – reflecting debt overhang and low commodity prices among other things. The expected growth differential between EM and the U.S. continues to narrow down, undermining the fundamental support for EM FX. We should note the potential for contagion risk in Brazil and Turkey perhaps, due to the size and importance of their economies.
A key feature of the intial steps of our investment process compares the risk premium of a country to its fundamentals) and we should emphasize that it does uncover pockets of value in local-currency markets. Colombia, Brazil, Zambia, Nigeria and others pay high real interest rates. However, in each of these cases, these investments failed the following step of our process which test specific risk factors. Colombia has been very correlated to oil prices, and we expect it will continue to be, and thus the failed correlation test, Brazil fails the policy/politics test, and Zambia and Nigeria are slowly moving to capital control regimes, in our opinion, and therefore, fail the policy/politics tests.
Exposure Types and Significant Changes The changes to our top positions are summarized below. Our largest positions are currently: South Korea, Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa and Russia.
We added local-currency sovereign and hard-currency quasi-sovereign debt exposure in Russia. We expect to benefit from a combination of a change in the geopolitical narrative that reduces the potential risk of additional sanctions and disinflation that should allow the central bank to further slash interest rates.
We reduced sovereign and quasi-sovereign hard-currency debt exposure in Chile due to concerns about the price of copper in light of the ongoing growth slowdown in China.
We also reduced local-currency sovereign exposure in Romania due to concerns about local politics and policy noise.
We reduced hard-currency sovereign exposure in Israel due to greater vulnerability risks as well as concerns about duration. We also reduced quasi-sovereign hard-currency exposure in Vietnam on greater vulnerability risks.
Fund Performance
The Fund (EMBAX) gained 0.13% in November, compared to a 1.11% loss for a 50% local-50% hard-currency index.
The Fund’s biggest winners were Venezuela (hard-currency sovereign), South Africa (hard currency sovereign and quasi-sovereign) and Ivory Coast (hard-currency sovereign). The Fund’s biggest losers were Argentina (hard-currency sovereign), Romania (local-currency sovereign) and Mongolia (hard-currency sovereign).
Turning to the market’s performance, the GBI-EM’s biggest winners were Nigeria, Brazil and Indonesia. The biggest losers were Colombia, South Africa and Hungary – with Colombia and South Africa affected by low commodity prices and policy rate hikes.
The EMBI’s biggest winners were Venezuela, Kazakhstan and Malaysia, while its biggest losers were Egypt, Chile and Mongolia (with the latter two affected by concerns about the price of copper).
Diversification does not assure a profit or prevent against a loss.
Expenses: Class A: Gross 1.32%; Net 1.25%. Expenses are capped contractually until 05/01/16 at 1.25% for Class A. Caps exclude certain expenses, such as interest. Please note that, generally, unconstrained bond funds may have higher fees than core bond funds due to the specialized nature of their strategies. The tables above present past performance which is no guarantee of future results and which may be lower or higher than current performance. Returns reflect applicable fee waivers and/or expense reimbursements. Had the Fund incurred all expenses and fees, investment returns would have been reduced. Investment returns and Fund share values will fluctuate so that investors’ shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Fund returns assume that dividends and capital gains distributions have been reinvested in the Fund at Net Asset Value (NAV). Index returns assume that dividends of the index constituents have been reinvested. Investing involves risk, including loss of principal; please see disclaimers on next page. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance current to the most recent month ended.
Data Sources: Van Eck Research, FactSet. All portfolio weightings and statements herein as of November 30, 2015. Unless otherwise indicated.
Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to interest rate changes that reflects the change in a bond’s price given a change in yield. This duration measure is appropriate for bonds with embedded options. Quantitative Easing by a central bank increases the money supply engaging in open market operations in an effort to promote increased lending and liquidity. Monetary Easing is an economic tool employed by a central bank to reduce interest rates and increase money supply in an effort to stimulate economic activity. Correlation is a statistical measure of how two variables move in relation to one other. Liquidity Illusion refers to the effect that an independent variable might have in the liquidity of a security as such variable fluctuates overtime. A Holdouts Issue in the fixed income asset class occurs when a bond issuing country or entity is in default or at the brink of default, and launches an exchange offer in an attempt to restructure its debt held by existing bond holding investors.
Emerging Markets Hard Currency Bonds refers to bonds denominated in currencies that are generally widely accepted around the world (such as the U.S.-Dollar, Euro or Yen). Emerging Markets Local Currency Bonds are bonds denominated in the local currency of the issuer. Emerging Markets Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by national governments of emerging countries in order to finance a country’s growth. Emerging Markets Quasi-Sovereign Bonds are bonds issued by corporations domiciled in emerging countries that are either 100% government owned or whose debts are 100% government guaranteed. Emerging Markets Corporate Bonds are bonds issued by non-government owned corporations that are domiciled in emerging countries. A Supranational is an international organization, or union, whose members transcend national boundaries and share in the decision-making. Examples of supranationals are: World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for the euro and administers monetary policy of the Eurozone, which consists of 19 EU member states and is one of the largest currency areas in the world. The Labor Market Conditions Index (LMCI) is a dynamic factor model index that combines 19 labor market indicators to provide an assessment of overall labor market conditions. The Employment Cost Index tracks the changes in the costs of labor for businesses in the United States economy.
All indices are unmanaged and include the reinvestment of all dividends, but do not reflect the payment of transaction costs, advisory fees or expenses that are associated with an investment in the Fund. An index’s performance is not illustrative of the Fund’s performance. Indices are not securities in which investments can be made. The 50/50 benchmark (the “Index”) is a blended index consisting of 50% J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified and 50% J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM). The J.P. Morgan Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets Global Diversified (GBI-EM) tracks local currency bonds issued by Emerging Markets governments. The index spans over 15 countries. J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global Diversified tracks returns for actively traded external debt instruments in emerging markets, and is also J.P. Morgan’s most liquid U.S-dollar emerging markets debt benchmark. The J.P. Morgan Emerging Country Currency Index (EMCI) is a tradable benchmark for emerging markets currencies versus the U.S. Dollar (USD). The Index compromises 10 currencies: BRL, CLP, CNH, HUF, INR, MXN, RUB, SGD, TRY and ZAR. The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is an indicator designed to measure consumer confidence, which is defined as the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers are expressing through their activities of savings and spending.
Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but J.P. Morgan does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The Index is used with permission. The index may not be copied, used or distributed without J.P. Morgan’s written approval. Copyright 2014, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved.
Investing involves risk, including loss of principal. You can lose money by investing in the Fund. Any investment in the Fund should be part of an overall investment program, not a complete program. The Fund is subject to risks associated with its investments in emerging markets securities. Investing in foreign denominated and/or domiciled securities may involve heightened risk due to currency fluctua-tions, and economic and political risks, which may be enhanced in emerging markets. As the Fund may invest in securities denominated in foreign currencies and some of the income received by the Fund will be in foreign currencies, changes in currency exchange rates may negatively impact the Fund’s return. Derivatives may involve certain costs and risks such as liquidity, interest rate, market, credit, management and the risk that a position could not be closed when most advantageous. The Fund may also be subject to credit risk, in¬terest rate risk, sovereign debt risk, tax risk, non-diversification risk and risks associated with non-investment grade securities. Please see the prospectus and summary prospectus for information on these and other risk considerations.
Investors should consider the Fund’s investment objective, risks, and charges and expenses carefully before investing. Bond and bond funds will decrease in value as interest rates rise. The prospectus and summary prospectus contain this as well as other information. Please read them carefully before investing. Please call 800.826.2333 or visit vaneck.com for performance information current to the most recent month end and for a free prospectus and summary prospectus.
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Den afrikanska aktiemarknaden kan vara lönsam men det finns risker….
Den afrikanska aktiemarknaden kan vara lönsam men det finns risker…. Investerare letar alltid världen över för att hitta nästa stora marknad, helst innan alla andra placerare gör det. I dagsläget ser vi hur många tittar på Afrikasom en sådan potentiell marknad, och det är inte ovanligt att dessa placerare använder sig av börshandlade fonder för att få en exponering mot denna kontinent då det inte alltid är helt lätt att använda sin vanliga Internetmäklare för att köpa afrikanska aktier.
Det finns i dag ett antal Afrika-fokuserade börshandlade fonder som investerare kan välja mellan, till exempel Market Vectors Africa Index ETF (NYSEArca: AFK) vars landspecifika vikter bestäms av storleken på landets bruttonationalprodukt och inkluderar företag som har sitt huvudkontor i eller genererar huvuddelen av sina intäkter i Afrika. AFK har fördelat kapitalet till Sydafrika22,0%, Egypten 20,6%, Nigeria 16,0%, Marocko 6,9%, Kenya 3,6%, Tanzania 2,2% och Zambia 2,1%.
SPDR S&P Emerging Middle East & Africa ETF (NYSEArca:GAF) kan anses vara en samlad satsning på Mellanöstern och Afrika, men denna börshandlade fond har en tung exponering mot Sydafrika, cirka 76,1 procent medan 9,9 procent av kapitalet har allokerats till Förenade Arabemiraten, 8,6 procent till Qatar, 3,5% till Egypten och 1,9 procent till Marocko.
Det går också att få en exponering mot Sydafrika, Egypten och Nigerias aktiemarknader genom landsspecifika börshandlade fonder, till exempel iShares MSCI South Africa ETF (NYSEArca: EZA), Market Vectors Egypt Index ETF (NYSEArca: EGPT) och Global X Nigeria Index ETF (NYSArca: NBE).
Snabbt expanderade gränsekonomier
Allt fler globala investerare och företag tar sig en titt på Afrika och de tillväxtmöjligheter som finns på denna kontinent med det snabbt expanderande frontier markets. Enligt Corporate Council on Africa så är det mer än 180 multinationella företag som överväger eller har redan investerat i Afrika. Bland annat kommer General Electric (NYSE: GE) att investera en kvarts miljard dollar i investeringar och upp till 800 MUSD för driftskostnader under de kommande tre åren i Nigeria. Acrow har lagt tusentals broar i över 20 afrikanska länder och planerar att leverera 144 broar till Zambia och 55 till Kamerun under slutet av 2015.
Paul Schatz, vd för förvaltningsbolaget Heritage Capital höjer emellertid ett varningens ord och manar till försiktighet i Afrika på grund av politisk instabilitet, terrorism, bristande statlig insyn och brist på likvida medel. Långsiktigt är han emellertid positiv. Han säger också att den som investerar tidigt i Afrikas ekonomier kommer att kunna få uppleva en Kinaliknande avkastning, men att detta kommer ske om cirka ett decennium. Afrikas demokratisering kan emellertid ge tillväxtmöjligheter för företagen och då kan uppgången komma snabbt. Den afrikanska aktiemarknaden kan vara lönsam när detta sker.
